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LA QUESTION DES ILES D'ALAND

Rapport présenté au Conseil de la Société des Nations
par la Commission des Rapporteurs.

League of Nations

THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION

Réport submitted to the Council of the League of Nations
by the Commission of Rapporteurs.

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THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.

Note by the Secretary-General :

The following Report from the Commission of Rapporteurs on the Aaland Islands question is circulated for the information of the Members of the Council.

**Report presented to the Council of the League
by the Commission of Rapporteurs.**

PART I

I

DESCRIPTION OF THE ISLANDS.

On departing from Stockholm on the way to Abo and leaving the Swedish coast, the steamer, after crossing the arm of the sea about 40 kilometres wide called "Aaland Sea," enters the Aaland Archipelago. After this, one meets with a continuous succession of islands, islets and skerries of a reddish colour, very close to one another, most of which are covered with a hardy vegetation of pines and firs growing amongst the rocks. Here and there one sees an isolated dwelling-place, or perhaps a lighthouse marking the route. The vessel follows a winding course, which now and then contracts to a narrow channel and arrives at the eastern end of the Archipelago of Aaland at the sheet of water named "Skiftet." This it crosses at its greatest breadth before entering the Archipelago of Abo.

The strait or passage of the Skiftet is not open sea. A chain of islets and reefs, not marked on ordinary maps, crosses the Skiftet and links up the group of the Aaland Islands to the neighbouring islands. It is hardly remarkable if these innumerable rocks, showing only a few metres above the water, do not appear upon any except the most detailed charts. One does not notice any difference in their geological aspect when leaving the Aaland Islands for their neighbours of the Archipelago of Abo; we meet with the same reddish granite, washed and polished by the sea, and the same northern vegetation. Thus, in passing through this maritime maze, one is led to make certain preliminary observations which are not without importance.

First of all, the Aaland Archipelago seems to be the geographical continuation of the Finnish Archipelagoes of Abo and Hango. It rises out of the sea on the base which continues the mainland of Finland. It is the extreme point, the spur of the Finnish mainland projecting into the Baltic between the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. On the west a sheet of water 300 or 400 metres deep separates it from Sweden. This is the Aaland Sea. On the east, in the channels which wind in and out of the islands, the depth does not exceed 40 metres, in consequence of which, every winter, these thousands of islands are connected with each other and with Finland by a vast icefield which is crossed by sledges.

A further remark which is not of lesser interest concerns the Skiftet. Does this passage constitute a natural frontier? We have crossed it on two occasions and at different latitudes. It greatly resembles another passage called "Delet," about the same size, and situated inside the eastern part of the Aaland Archipelago.

Both are full of islets and rocks. Navigation there is so difficult that it can only be accomplished without danger in broad daylight or on a very clear night. The Skiftet is not a boundary traced by nature. It is crossed from east to west and *vice versa* in places marked by lighthouses and beacons; it is not marked for navigation in its length. That it was taken long ago, under the Swedish régime, as a boundary of the Province of Aaland is explained by administrative reasons, as the Skiftet was the boundary of the eastern Aaland parishes. But it would be a bad frontier between two States, extremely arbitrary from a geographical point of view.

Finally, it is impossible to visit the Aaland Islands without being struck by their strategic importance. The Aaland labyrinth forms a sort of triangle, of which one side faces the Gulf of Bothnia and the other, the Baltic, while the apex threatens Sweden in immediate proximity to her capital, Stockholm. The principal island is situated much nearer to the Swedish coast than the Finnish. In time of war the Aaland Sea would be easy to close by means of mines, and the Gulf of Bothnia would thus be closed to navigation.

The possession of the Islands is of very great interest for the State which is mistress of the western shores of the Baltic, but this interest is no less for the State on the eastern shore. It is easy to understand that both of them attach a great value to it. To quote the metaphors frequently employed, the Aaland Archipelago is a dagger which is always raised, or a pistol which is always levelled, against the heart of Sweden. Indeed, from the principal island, it would be an easy matter for an enemy to launch an expedition against Stockholm. On her side, Finland is joined to the Aaland Islands in winter by the ice, which would offer easy access to an invader, while Sweden is defended by a sea, narrow, it is true, but almost always open. The Aaland Sea has frozen over only nine times in the whole of the last century. A glance at the map shows that the Archipelago in foreign hands would constitute a serious danger for the Finnish mainland or at least a considerable weakening of their means of defence. Thus, it is a key of security both for Finland and for Sweden.

It is composed of one large island, the Island of Aaland proper, " *fasta Aaland*," or mainland of Aaland, and about 300 others, much smaller, amongst which the principal are Eckero in the west, quite close to Aaland; Lemland, Lumparland and Foglo in the south-east; Vardo and Kumlinge in the east; and, the most remote Brando, in the north-east. The shores of the Island of Aaland are extremely indented and picturesque. Bays cutting deep into the land form natural ports and give the country the appearance of certain Swiss lakes, but with the more harsh and sombre characteristics which are the feature of Scandinavian nature. Between the Islands of Aaland, of Lemland and Lumparland, all close to one another, is a sheet of water, the Gulf of Lumparen, which could serve as an anchorage for a navy. The Russian Government, appreciating its military utility, constructed the fortress of Bomarsund to protect this place of refuge. The total surface of the Islands is 1,426 square kilometres.

The Island of Aaland, together with the adjacent islands of Eckero and Lumparland, measures about 50 kilometres by 40. Woods composed of pines, birches, elms, aspens, ashes and a few oaks, alternate with tilled fields where wheat, barley, oats, rye and potatoes are grown. The granite found on the coast peeps out again on the hills about 300 to 500 feet high, while small lakes and a few marshes twinkle in the valleys.

One sees no trace of misery or even of poverty. The houses of the peasants are built of wood and painted in vivid colours in the Swedish fashion. They are separated from one another, and appear to be spacious and comfortable. There are low cattle-sheds alongside them. There are no railways, but the roads are well kept and when travelling along them on Sunday, we met numerous carts drawn by sturdy horses. A healthy climate which is less rigorous than that of Finland, and softened by the sea breezes from the South, ensures the public health, with the result that epidemics are rare, if one excepts endemic malaria, which is no doubt due to the marshes. The cold does not commence to be severe before the beginning of the month of January. The spring is damp and late on account of the ice thawing in the Baltic, which takes place only gradually. The fine season commences in the summer.

POPULATION.

The Island of Aaland consists of nine parishes or communes, to which must be added seven communes scattered amongst the other islands. The population, according to the parish registers, numbers 27,000 souls from which must be subtracted 5,000 persons living abroad. The Island of Aaland alone contains 16,000 inhabitants, which accounts for the preponderating part played by the leading

island in all questions of interest to the insular province. For the sake of convenience we shall frequently describe the Archipelago by the name of its large island.

The appearance of well-being, of ease and abundance, which is an agreeable surprise to the stranger in view of the privations which the Aalanders endured during four years of war and blockade, is nowhere more remarkable than at Mariehamn, the capital of Aaland. It is a charming little town of 1,600 souls, astride a promontory which is thrust forward between two bays overlooked by wooded hills. It is built on a regular plan in squares, and each house, surrounded by its garden, has a villa-like appearance. Mariehamn is a bathing-place which both Swedes and Finns gladly visit. The natives let their houses to them, and live in the country during the summer, often even during the first weeks of autumn.

Mariehamn is the site of the local administration of Aaland. A governor, who is himself an Aalander by birth, has resided there since 1918, living, like the rest of the officials, apart from the population, which affects ignorance of his presence. Two companies of soldiers, the one composed of Swedish Finns, the other of Finns, are quartered there to keep order, which is not disturbed by the essentially peaceful manifestations made by the inhabitants to deny all community with Finland and its institutions and in this manner to demonstrate their attachment to Sweden.

The intellectual level is high. This little group of islanders enjoys good teaching, like all their Scandinavian cousins. They are fond of reading and possess public libraries. The parishes are provided with primary schools. At Finström, in the centre of the Island of Aaland, there is a popular "Volksschule" on the Swedish model which serves for technical instruction; at Mariehamn there is a secondary school for girls and boys and a navigation school. In the primary schools the instruction is in Swedish; in the others in Swedish and Finnish, and the study of the Finnish language has been compulsory for the past two years. Swedish is the language for purposes of administration, justice and religion. Mariehamn has one newspaper — "Aaland" — which is the organ of the men who have directed the separatist movement. Mariehamn is connected by telephone with all the parishes of the Archipelago.

For the last twenty five years most of the Finnish banks have had branches in the Archipelago, and there is one private bank at Mariehamn. According to the information given to us on the spot, there are deposits amounting to 50 millions of Finnish marks in these and in the savings banks.

The Aaland Islanders with whom we dealt with regard to the burning question which agitates them to-day, members of the Landsting and leading inhabitants of the islands, made a very sympathetic impression upon their hearers. Their open countenances breathe honesty, and are full of frankness and gravity. The population has a well-deserved reputation for industry, frugality and economy, without which it could not have attained to its present standard of comfort on a soil which is, if anything, unfriendly. They are altogether Swedish in origin, in habits, in language and in culture; 96.2 % of the inhabitants are Swedes. The men are tall, strong and squarely built, and bear clearly the marks of their race.

The number of Finnish immigrants, employed as farm labourers or workers in the saw-mills, has increased considerably since 1880, when there were only 194 Finns in the islands. There were 448 in 1895, 893 in 1910, 1,363 in 1914, while some of them have become Swedish, little by little.

AGRICULTURE.

The soil under cultivation is only 4.4 % (6,316 hectares) of the island territory and is divided into small holdings of from 6 to 120 hectares. Although agriculture accounts for 44 % of the workers in Aaland, it is not the inhabitants' primary source of revenue. The cereal harvest is even quite insufficient for local requirements. Cattle, on the other hand, are numerous — about 500 or 600 head per 1,000 inhabitants, which enables them to export fresh beef and veal. Milk and butter are likewise profitable articles of export, the butter being sent as far as to England. There are sixteen co-operative dairies and one co-operative slaughter-house, which produce good results.

INDUSTRY.

On account of their insular situation, the Islanders have been accustomed from time immemorial to turn the sea to account: 10.8 % are engaged in fishing, an industry which has expanded greatly, being both a means of subsistence and a source of profit to the islands. The Baltic is full of small herring, of which the Aalanders export large quantities. A certain number of them are at once fishermen and agricultural labourers.

The islands possess no mineral riches. They contain only granite, which is

not used for building purposes, chalk and clay; the latter is used in the tile and brick works of Aaland.

A great part of the soil is covered with forests, the exploitation of which is an important source of profit, in the shape of firewood, wood for building, and wood for the construction of ships. There are several saw-mills at Mariehamn.

NAVIGATION.

However, these different branches of industry are not the only factors in the prosperity of Aaland nor, in our opinion, the principal ones. It should be added that a great part is played by sea-borne traffic. The Aaland Islanders are born sailors, and their merchant fleet has always been considerable, compared with that of Finland. They have building yards at Haraldsby, a port where vessels drawing from 18 to 19 feet of water can anchor, while that of Mariehamn is only accessible to vessels up to 1,000 tons and has only repairing yards without a dry dock.

It is neither coastal traffic between the Baltic ports nor traffic between these and ports abroad that are most favoured by Aaland shipowners and sailors. Like their rude ancestors, the Vikings, they are hardy and enterprising and do not fear to brave the dangers of distant seas; but in addition, they have a business instinct. In support of this assertion, the following information has been given to us by M. Lars Krogus, director of one of the principal shipping companies at Helsingfors¹:

According to these statistics for the sea-borne trade of Finland for the year 1919, the total number of Finnish vessels of 500 tons and over sailing outside the Baltic was 83, with a tonnage of 91,500. Of this number 16 sailing vessels and one steamer belonged to Aaland, 44 sailing vessels and 37 steamers to other ship-owners in Finland. This shows, to begin with, that the Aalanders only build and equip sailing vessels. With regard to the kind of traffic in which their vessels are engaged, it should be noted that in 1919 they took only an insignificant part in the trade between Finnish and foreign ports and that they carried only a small share of goods arriving in or leaving Finland, and that the sum earned by them under this head was only 4,500,000 marks, while, in the case of the Finnish fleet, it amounted to nearly 106 millions of marks. This is because some of the Aalanders with their large three- or four-masted sailing vessels preferred running between foreign countries — England, Belgium, France and Western Scandinavia on the one side and South Africa, Australia, North and South America on the other, or even between Africa, South America and Australia; in a word to engage in long-distance navigation and overseas traffic. From these long voyages they made large sums of money in 1919, estimated by M. Lars Krogus at 20 million marks, while all the other Finnish vessels engaged in similar enterprises only earned 53 million marks for their owners. This is the explanation given of the economic situation and the mode of life amongst the Aalanders — the general standard of living — which is considerably higher than that on the mainland of Finland, although the figures for imports and exports for Aaland do not seem to justify such an advantageous position.

This information with regard to long-distance navigation was confirmed by the statement of one of the Aaland ship-owners. He told us that he and his colleagues had been in this business throughout the war, in spite of the ravages of the German submarines. Their losses had been considerable, about 12,000 tons, and he himself had lost a four-master. He had still two sailing vessels, one of which was taking English coal to Buenos-Ayres, and the other nitrate from Chile to South African ports. But at the present moment, this business is far from being as profitable as before, on account of the general drop in freights from which shipping in all countries is suffering.

It only remains to say a few words with regard to the communications between the Aaland Islands and Finland on the one side, and between the Aaland Islands and Sweden on the other, according to information received from the same Finnish sources. Since the establishment of regular services between Finland (Abo and Helsingfors) and Stockholm by companies having their head office in Finland, the Aaland Islanders have enjoyed good communications both East and West by steamers which call at Aaland. Formerly, the steamers sailed only during the summer months, and the Aaland Islanders were obliged to keep up communication with the Finnish mainland by crossing the ice with sledges and horses. With regard to their relations to Sweden it was difficult for them to maintain these in all weathers, the crossing of the Aaland Sea being particularly severe for sailing vessels

¹ *Annexe 1*: Memorandum concerning the shipping trade carried on by the inhabitants of Aaland concerning the conditions of navigation between the Aaland Islands and the mainland of Finland.

during the bad season. A regular service has been established during the winter months, thanks to the assistance of the Finnish State. The contribution by the Helsingfors Government is very heavy and out of proportion to the number of passengers and the quantity of goods carried to or from Aaland. The use of a little steamer, specially used for the service between Mariehamn and Abo, and calling on its way at several other islands, costs the Government at the present moment more than 1,500,000 marks during the winter, making only one journey a week. The expenditure goes chiefly towards the upkeep of powerful ice-breakers which make a passage for the steamer.

EMIGRATION.

The actual emigration from Aaland amounts, as indicated above, to about 5,000 persons out of a total of 27,000 souls, or about one-fifth of the inhabitants. A certain number of these emigrants return home in the ordinary course of events, after having amassed sufficient money to enable them to settle down at home as farmers or shipowners. It is, however, none the less true that during the last fifty years emigration has deprived the Archipelago of part of its youngest and most active element.

There has been a similar surplus population throughout Scandinavia, and Scandinavians have, from time immemorial, possessed the spirit of adventure and a great facility for settling down abroad. The prodigious development of the United States re-awakened their taste for such adventure during the last century, in addition to the attraction of a possible fortune and the allurements of high salaries. During the four years of the world war, this migratory movement was necessarily suspended in Aaland by the blockade of the Baltic.

It should be stated that the Aalanders we questioned at Mariehamn attributed the emigration of their fellow-countrymen to a moral cause, more noble than material interest. They felt stifled under the Russian domination and have always hated military service, to which they were subjected until 1901. Their love of independence has attracted them towards the United States, for the American Union appeared to them to be liberty personified. Emigration on the part of the Islanders has recommenced after the war, but on a smaller scale, and at present, if anything, to Sweden.

COMMERCE.

While in Stockholm, we were not able to obtain documentary evidence as regards the economic life and movement of the Aaland Islands, nor upon their commerce with Sweden, which is hardly surprising. In the Swedish Commercial Statistics, there is no special column for the traffic with the Archipelago. It is included in the general trade with Finland. All that the Members of the Official Swedish Mission for the study of the Aaland question were able to tell us was that, in their opinion, the trade of the Islands with Sweden is as large as that with Finland, and consists principally of firewood, butter and fish.

We have not obtained more definite information from the Aalanders themselves, a fact which we regret. They contented themselves with the statement that their trade with Sweden is much more important than that with Finland.

We have therefore been compelled to rely on the information supplied to us by the Finnish Minister of Commerce, without being able to check it by comparison with information obtained from other sources¹.

This information refers exclusively to the Aaland commerce with abroad. Taking the figures of two years as an example, those of 1913, the last normal year before the war, and of 1919, which was still influenced by the disorganisation in commercial life, we find that the imports into Aaland from abroad had in 1913 a value of 509,000 marks and in 1919 3,495,000; that the exports of Aaland in 1913 amounted to 1,496,000 marks and in 1919 to 2,856,000 marks. The goods imported were products of primary necessity, cereals, colonial products, minerals, metals, machines, cotton and cotton goods. The products exported consisted of firewood, wood for building purposes and articles of wood, fish, meat, dairy produce, fruit and berries.

The commercial relations of Aaland and Sweden were, as is only natural, of far greater importance than those with other foreign countries, amounting in 1919 to 90 % of the importation and the whole of the exportation, with the exception of dairy produce, but by no means comparable, as far as the imports are concerned, to the commercial relations with Finland. The Minister, of Commerce based this

¹ Annexe 2 : The foreign trade of Aaland, especially with regard to Sweden.

statement, not on figures, but upon the following argument. The Aaland population is richer and leads a more comfortable life than that of the average of the Finnish population, and consequently the consumption of foreign goods in the Islands ought to be greater than in the rest of the country. However, according to official figures, the external trade of Aaland was negligible in comparison with the total trade of the country, and the consumption per inhabitant very low in comparison with that in the other parts of Finland (about one-fifth). What should be deduced from this? If it is assumed, not unreasonably, that the requirements of the Aalanders are as great as those of the inhabitants of other provinces, it must be from Finland that they have obtained the foreign products which they need and from Finland that they have imported the merchandise of which they stood in need.

And what of the exports from Aaland to Finland? Neither on this interesting point was the Minister able to give us precise information by the help of figures, as no customs frontier exists between the Archipelago and the rest of the country. However, he did not hesitate to declare that the quantity of Aaland products consumed in other provinces greatly exceeded that of products sent to Sweden. The proof of this is the sale of salt herring at the fairs of Abo and Helsingfors, which is the livelihood of a great number of the Aaland fishermen for the whole year. 6,263 barrels of herring, of a value of 1 ½ million marks, were brought to the market of Abo in 1919 as compared with 50 barrels exported to Sweden, without counting that sold at Helsingfors and in the other southern ports.

To sum up, Finnish statistics do not produce conclusive figures with regard to the commercial relations of Aaland with Finland. They do not radically destroy on economic grounds the arguments advanced by the Aalanders in favour of their separation, which for that matter are not themselves based on positive figures.

SMUGGLING.

We cannot pass by this subject in complete silence. It exists alongside regular trade in many other countries. There are more opportunities for it, and the temptation which it offers is stronger when a State makes a complete prohibition or reserves for its territory the monopoly of a product in common demand. This is the case in the new Finnish State, which has forbidden the use of alcoholic liquors. Thus, alcohol is frequently smuggled into Finland, nor is it the only article which is illegally introduced. Sugar, tobacco and coffee can be added to the list. The numerous islands and islets of the Finnish archipelagoes and the hiding-places which they offer to smugglers, favour their audacity and render control by Custom Officers extremely difficult. These remarks apply equally to the coasts and islands of the Gulf of Finland, where smuggling is almost constant, and it presumably exists similarly on the coasts of the Gulf of Bothnia.

We were not so indiscreet as to ask the Aaland Islanders if they were in the habit of smuggling, or if the population of their islands enjoys profit thereby. We only touched very lightly on this point. We were assured that there was no secret traffic in alcohol in Aaland. This is a most remarkable fact and we will content ourselves with noting this assurance without comment.

II

POLITICAL HISTORY.

SWEDEN, FINLAND AND THE AALAND ISLANDS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES.

Swedish and Finnish historians have engaged in a vigorous argument, ransacking the archives of their respective countries in the endeavour to determine whether the Aaland Islands were part of Sweden or of Finland, from the Middle Ages up to the Russian conquest. We must confess that we only attribute a relative importance to this historical problem, however absorbing it may be for both parties. In our opinion, the events of a more recent date, commencing with the year 1808, must above all be taken into consideration, because they have created a new situation, altogether different from that of the past, on the shores of the Baltic and have contributed to the determination of the political and legal status of Finland for more than a century. Now, it is especially from a study of this situation and this status from close quarters that it seems convenient, in our opinion, to consider the solution of the difference provoked by the claims of the inhabitants of Aaland.

However, we cannot pass over the historical relations of the Aaland Islands with Sweden and with Finland in our summary without laying ourselves open to the

charge of having neglected the labours and the opinions of scholars of high repute, by reason of preconceived ideas. We shall therefore reproduce the principal arguments of the two opposing theories, but without developing them in a manner which would greatly exceed the scope of this report.

To begin with, we cannot see what interest it would have for the result of our enquiries to attempt to penetrate the darkness of prehistoric ages, in the endeavour to ascertain who were the first inhabitants of the Archipelago, and whether the aboriginal population was of Germanic or of Finno-Ugric race. We learn that the traces which they have left, brought to light by archæological researches, are Swedish in aspect. However, the occupation of the Archipelago was certainly a *fait accompli* by the 12th century and the Aaland Islands appear to have served as a first halting-place and a naval base for the Scandinavian warriors in their expeditions against Finland. This military colonisation was conducted in the form of three successive crusades against the pagan peoples of the Finnish mainland, the desire for religious conversion inspiring the arms of the Christian conquerors in the Baltic, as in other parts of medieval Europe. But when they reached Carelia, the Swedes found themselves face to face with the Russians of Novgorod, and from that date began the duel between the two races, who were destined to fight for the empire of the Baltic, a duel which lasted throughout the ages, with varying fortune and truces of greater or lesser duration, up to the peace of Frederikshamn in 1809.

The first controversy between the Swedish historians and their Finnish colleagues is to determine what signification should be attributed to the term "Finland" when found in medieval documents. Did it already designate an administrative unit distinct from the Kingdom of Sweden proper and embracing approximately the same territories as it does to-day? Or was it not, as the Swedes claim, a collective geographical expression, including vaguely a certain number of provinces situated east of the Gulf of Bothnia?

For a long time, according to the Swedes, these eastern provinces had no common denomination. In speaking of them, the word "Osterland" was used the country of the east. But as the most important province round the town of Abo was properly called "Finland," this name eventually predominated in designating the neighbouring provinces at the same time. There was no special administrative organisation to distinguish them from the others and their frontiers remained undetermined. In 1362, in the reign of Hakon, the inhabitants of the eastern provinces were accorded the rights of citizens of the realm, amongst which was that of taking part in the election of the Sovereign.

The name "Duchy of Finland" does not appear in history until 1556, when Gustav Vasa created as a duchy for his son John a part of the Transbaltic region, that is to say, "the provinces of Abo and Kymmenegard, as well as the whole of Aaland." In the letters-patent of gift, and later in the will of Gustav Vasa, dating from 1560, the name "Finland" appears as the general term for the provinces composing the new Duchy. In 1581, John III added the title of Grand-Duke of Finland to the others which he set up against his Moscovite adversary, Ivan IV, and other foreign Sovereigns. This Duchy by no means included all the territory situated east of the Gulf of Bothnia, nor did it have a long life. It disappeared with John III, as the result of a fratricidal war between the latter and his brother Eric IV. The title Grand Duke of Finland, however, continued to be used by the Kings of Sweden up till the 18th century.

Finnish historians on their side remark that, from an ecclesiastical point of view, throughout the Middle Ages Finland formed a single diocese, that of Abo. This fact is, according to them, not unimportant, for the Catholic Church enjoyed at that time the same authority both in matters temporal and ecclesiastical in Sweden as in the other countries of Western Europe. The Bishop of Abo was an ex-officio member of the Council of the Realm of Sweden and represented Finland in this Council. The Estates or Orders of Finland took part in the general assemblies of the Realm, which were held in Sweden, but there were also assemblies held in Finland, and occasionally for the whole country, assemblies which were provincial in character. The judicial system there was the same as that in Sweden. In 1407 a Supreme Court was brected for the whole of Finland; in 1623, Gustavus Adolphus instituted at Abo a Court of Appeal from all the Finnish Courts of Appeal and of first instance.

Another controversy has arisen with regard to the particular situation of the Archipelago of Aaland. Was it attached to the region of the far side of the Baltic throughout the Middle Ages and the first century of modern times, or did it remain joined to Sweden proper? The professors of both countries have furnished us with numerous items of information which they have gathered from documents of the past in support of their respective theories. It is impossible for us to follow this laborious discussion step by step.

We shall content ourselves with stating with the Swedes that the Swedish military organisation, the "Ledung," was introduced into the Archipelago at an early date; that up to 1435 it constituted a special judicial district, and was at that time attached to the newly created district of "Norfinn," which comprised

as the name indicates, the North of Finland, and that to begin with, for administrative purposes, it formed a distinct bailiwick, that of Kastelholm, the old dungeon of which exists to-day. At different periods the Archipelago was joined to the lordship of Åbo, or was separated for the creation of an independent lordship.

In the 16th century the administration of the Islands was subjected to numerous changes of which it will suffice to note the most important. Up to 1555 they composed a separate bailiwick, which sent its revenues direct to Stockholm. In 1569, they were given as an apanage to the Queen-Mother, Katherine Stenbock, and they were administered conjointly with the Estates which this Princess owned in Sudermania. But the Queen exchanged Åland for the province of Drottningholm. From that time the Archipelago passed under the authority of different Governors up to the great Administrative Reform of 1634.

The Finns absolutely reject the assertion according to which the Islands formed a part of Sweden proper during the period up to 1634. As regards ecclesiastical jurisdiction, they assert that they were subordinated to the diocese of Åbo from the beginning of the 14th century and probably even earlier: from a judicial point of view they belonged to the district of the Chief Justice of Österland up to 1435, and after the division of this district, to that of the Chief Justice of Norfinn and later to that of Åbo and Björneborg. After the institution of the Court of Appeal of Åbo in 1623, Åland came under this Court. For administrative purposes, throughout the Middle Ages and the first century of modern times, Åland formed a separate province under the same conditions as the other provinces of Finland and was from time to time placed under the Governor of the Castle of Åbo. Åland's delegate to the Stockholm Riksdag was counted among those from Finland, and its representatives sat on the Finnish provincial Diets.

CONSTITUTION OF 1634.

We have now arrived at a date in the history of Sweden where the situation of the Åland Islands is stabilised both as regards the original kingdom and the Finnish provinces. In 1634 the Chancellor Oxenstierna issued the celebrated constitution which gave the States of the Vasas, which had been greatly increased on the fringe of the Baltic by the conquests of Gustavus Adolphus, an organisation which was more centralised and more systematic. The Kingdom was divided into twenty-three Governments. Article 23 of this Constitution enumerates them in an order which is not determined by any geographical consideration, but by the rank or importance attributed to the Governors. The Governments of the Eastern provinces are mixed up with those of the Western provinces. The order in which the Governors are grouped excludes any administrative division between Sweden and Finland. It is simply stated in the Constitution that no one can sit in the Riksdag and other Assemblies without being domiciled either in Sweden or in Finland, which appears to constitute these two countries the kingdom proper, in contradistinction to the territories, whether Baltic or German, regarded as conquered provinces. Åland figures under No. 4: "Governor of Northern and Southern Finland as well as Åland with residence at Åbo".¹

In view of this classification it is quite comprehensible that the Finnish professors rely on the administrative reform of Oxenstierna to deduce from this fact that Åland formed part of Finland from 1634 onwards, as the union lasted without interruption for the rest of the Swedish period up to 1808. Even whilst admitting that the term Finland was nothing but a purely geographical signification, it is none the less true that Åland in 1634 was definitely joined to the Administration of the provinces of Åbo and Björneborg, and not to that of a Swedish province west of the Gulf of Bothnia. The fact that Finland did not constitute a separate territory makes no difference in this state of things. Several times, in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, Governors-General were named for Finland, with a view to grouping under a single command the means of defence and the military resources of the region which was exposed to the Russian peril, and each time Åland was placed under the authority of these Governors.

At Stockholm it was explained to us — just as does the Memorandum presented to the Supreme Council by the Swedish Delegates (August 4th, 1919) — that the union of Åland to the provinces of Åbo and Björneborg was for reasons of a practical nature. The Governor of Åbo was a member of the nobility in the Swedish Diet and was frequently called to the capital. In proceeding thither or returning to his residence, he visited and inspected the Åland Archipelago on his way. Can a careful historian be satisfied with this explanation? Was the Chancellor Oxenstierna, the most eminent statesman produced by Sweden, only guided by the motive

¹ The Åland Islands question. Memorandum presented to the Peace Conference by the Swedish Delegates (already communicated to the Members to the Council).

of making the inspection of the islands of his district more convenient for a Governor, when he joined this island province to the provinces of the Finnish mainland? Is it not more natural to admit that Oxenstierna had in mind the fact that geographically the Archipelago is connected with the province of Abo, *i. e.* with the Finnish Continent?

The Swedish writers persist in affirming that Aaland has maintained the character of separate provincial unity from 1634. The Kingdom of Sweden was formed by the union of various provinces, enjoying to a very considerable extent an autonomous administration under a centralised monarchy. From the 17th century on, the Royal Power, to establish its growing influence, established large administrative districts at the head of which he placed a "landshövding," or Governor. In certain cases the boundaries of these Governments corresponded with those of the provinces; in others they were different. A Government could be composed of several provinces, or else of a whole province with the fraction of another province. The division into Governments did not cause the old division into provinces to disappear. The fact that in 1634 Aaland was made a constituent part of the Government of Abo and Björneborg by no means proves that this province was politically or even administratively incorporated in the two Finnish provinces, but simply means that these three provinces, each one keeping its local administration by parishes, deaneries, and bailiwicks, were placed in certain respects under a common higher administration.

To prove that Aaland continued to occupy an independent position in the 17th and 18th centuries, and preserved its character of a distinct province having particular interests, the Swedes have referred to the peculiarities of its administrative and fiscal organisations, which were different from those of Abo. Thus a special survey was made for Aaland up to 1753. The Crown accounts relative to Aaland do not figure in those of the province of Abo. In the great account books of the Kingdom, the Archipelago is entered as a province apart, distinct from Finland or inscribed under the common heading of Norrland, or "country of the North".

Nevertheless, the denomination Finland, and Grand-Duchy of Finland as applied to the region situated to the east of the Gulf of Bothnia, became more and more common, and there was a tendency to make a distinction between it and Sweden in common talk, although it was not sanctioned officially by an act of the Royal Power. This separation was adopted by geographers, who made the fine maps which have been preserved in the libraries of Stockholm and Helsingfors: those of Andreus Bureus (1626) official "general-mathematicus"; Hans Hansson, his pupil, surveyor and geometrician to the King; Count Gyllenborg (1775); Wetterstedt (1775), director of the Board of Survey of Finland; Hermelin, author of a well-known atlas published in 1797-1801, etc. We cannot mention all the ancient geographers whose maps were kindly shown to us, both in Stockholm and Helsingfors; the authorities were even obliging enough to send us copies of certain of these.

What was aimed at on both sides by the production of these maps was to demonstrate the importance which they had for the Aaland question. None of those which were shown to us at Stockholm established the existence of a geographical unit composed of Aaland and Finland. In some cases a well-defined frontier expressly marked as such separated them, in others they were marked in different colours. It is true that at Helsingfors we were shown some maps which seemed to prove the contrary. On the copy of Hermelin's atlas preserved in this capital the Aaland Islands are marked in the same colouring as the mainland of Finland, while Sweden proper is coloured differently. We should be greatly embarrassed to have to draw conclusions from the evidence of these maps, which contradict one another. Is it not wiser to make no remarks on this subject? The problem which we have to solve depends neither upon the geographical distinctions made by cartographers who lived centuries ago, and who were some of them foreigners, nor on the tints in which they have coloured the plates which they engraved. In face of these contradictions and uncertainties, the historical fact that Aaland, from the year 1634, has always been united to the Abo Administration only gains the more importance.

THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND SWEDEN (1808-1809).

In the 18th century began the decline of the Swedish power in the Baltic, which ceased to be a Swedish lake, and the dismemberment of its Eastern provinces commenced. In spite of the reputation gained by Charles XII in the struggle against Peter the Great, the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 confirmed this rapid decline. Finland, which had been for seven years in the hands of the Russians, and Aaland itself, which had been occupied by the Czar in 1741, were returned to Sweden, but the Finnish territory was diminished by the loss of the province of Viborg. The resumption of hostilities in 1741 was no more successful for the Swedes. The defeat

of the army commanded by General Lewenhaupt once more delivered the whole of the Transbaltic country and the Archipelago of Aaland to the Russians. The Peace of Abo in 1743 returned the islands to Sweden, but deprived it of yet another piece of Finland as far as the river of Kymmene. A third war (1788-1790) during the reign of Gustav III led to no change in the frontiers.

A last struggle, and this time a decisive one, was inevitable for both countries. It broke out at the beginning of the 19th century and resulted in the total loss of Finland for the Swedish monarchy. The alleged causes of the war, concealing the secret designs of Alexander I, were the refusal of the King of Sweden, Gustav IV, to adhere to the continental blockade, and his obstinately hostile policy towards Napoleon. The reconciliation of the Emperor and the Czar at Tilsit left the latter with free hands as regards his Swedish neighbour. In the month of February 1808, a Russian army under the command of Buxhovden invaded Finland without a declaration of war and met with little resistance, either on the part of troops who were led by an incapable chief, Marshal Klinspor, or on the part of civil or military authorities.

After the soldiers of General Knorring had occupied the South-West of the country (March 1808), the Governor of Abo gave an order on the 15th March to the Royal Bailiff of Aaland to requisition food in the Islands to meet the needs of the Russian Army. This order aroused the strongest opposition amongst the inhabitants. On the 19th March, a popular assembly was held at Iomala, where the orders from Abo were discussed amidst great agitation. The Assembly decided to refuse all supplies to the enemy and unanimously affirmed its loyalty to the King and Swedish mother-country. A deputation of four inhabitants proceeded to Stockholm, in spite of the difficulties of crossing at this season, to inform the Royal Government of this resolution and to assure it that the population would resist the invader to the utmost, if the means were provided, principally officers and munitions.

On the 18th March, on hearing of the advance of the Russians, Gustav IV had decreed that, during the occupation of the province of Abo and Björneborg, Aaland would be placed directly under the Governor of Stockholm, the Chapter of Upsala and the Court of Appeal of Svéa. The same resolution was made a little later in respect of certain islands in the Abo Archipelago which had been retaken by his troops. But this attachment was dictated by the circumstances and only of an ephemeral duration, owing to the final outcome of the hostilities.

In the month of April a Russian detachment 600 strong occupied the island of Kumlinge, while another occupied the principal island of Aaland and their commander ordered requisitions. The inhabitants of Aaland rushed to arms as they had promised their sovereign; led by Sheriff Aren and Pastor Gummerus, they succeeded in surprising and taking the small enemy troop prisoner. They then proceeded to Kumlinge, where, with the aid of a hundred or so Swedish soldiers, they forced the Russians to surrender. The victory of Kumlinge was effected with insignificant losses, two killed and five wounded; but it had fortunate consequences and an excellent moral effect, as it preserved the Swedish coast from a threatened invasion, and permitted the Royal Government to resume military operations on the mainland of Finland with more confidence and vigour.

Nearly a year passed by before the Russian Generals resumed their attempt at the invasion of the Aaland Archipelago. This time was profitably employed by the Government of Gustav IV in sending soldiers and the preparation of resistance there. The King himself came to visit his loyal subjects and placed in command of them one of his best generals, Döbeln. But the latter did not have the opportunity of gaining renown by the defence of Aaland which he organised. The coup d'état which took place in Stockholm on March 13th, 1809, put a new Government into power, and the General received from it an order to return to Sweden with his troops. Some days afterwards the Russians returned in force and became masters of all the islands almost without opposition.

On the Swedish side historians have taken pleasure in contrasting the patriotic conduct of the Aaland peasants with the hasty submission of the authorities and upper classes in Finland to the Russian power, explaining the difference in attitude by the inviolable attachment of the former to Sweden, a sentiment which no longer existed to the same extent on the other side of the Gulf. The Finnish retort is that there were also peasant revolts against the invader on the mainland, in Ostrobothnia, in Savolax and in Carelia, revolts which were promptly crushed, it is true, because the insurgents of the mainland of Finland could not by reason of their remoteness be aided by Swedish regular troops as were those of Aaland. If in this war the surrender of the fortress of Sveaborg, which was supposed to be impregnable, was a disgraceful blot on Finnish loyalty, the army struggling against the Russians distinguished itself by courage, and even gained some fruitless victories under such brave generals as Döbeln, Sandels and Adlercreutz.

Nevertheless — even some Finnish writers themselves admit this — although the separation of Finland from Sweden was effected by violence, it was also the result of a gradual evolution. The Finnish nobles and middle classes were tired

of seeing their estates ravaged by the Russians in every fresh war without the Government of Stockholm being capable of defending them. Certain members of these two classes accustomed themselves to thinking not unfavourably of the idea of a State independent of Sweden and under the protectorate of Russia, which was nearer and more powerful. This explains how an understanding could so rapidly be established between the Finns and the conqueror, even during the course of hostilities.

PEACE OF FREDRIKSHAMN.

An internal crisis then occurred in Sweden in the midst of the war which culminated in the coup d'état of 1809 and the deposition of Gustav IV. Even before these events, the Czar was beginning to wish for peace¹, in view of the difficulties of feeding his army in the North of Finland and the approach of a new struggle between Austria and France, of which he wished to be an attentive witness while retaining his liberty of action. To begin with, he would have been content with the cession of Finland with the River Tornea as frontier in the North and the closing of the Swedish ports to English vessels. But he saw the possibility of profiting by the coup d'état, and his claims increased because he knew that the resistance of Sweden was broken.

Pourparlers for peace were opened on the 14th August, 1809, at Fredrikshamn. The instructions given to the Swedish Plenipotentiary Stedingk bade him refuse the complete closing of the ports, which would have involved Sweden in a conflict with England, to try to keep the Finnish province of Ostrobothnia and, if unsuccessful, only to accept as frontier the River Kemi: in any case to keep Aaland.

Stedingk emphasised the military and political importance of the Archipelago to the Russian negotiator, Roumiantzoff. In the hands of the Russians, it would be a direct threat against Stockholm, a military base against the heart of the country. Its possession by a foreign Power would compel Sweden to maintain her troops on a war footing. Further, from there, the communications between the capital and the ports of Norrland could be cut. Finally, the Islands had never been an integral part of Finland, but, if anything, a separate Government; consequently the cession of Finland need not involve that of the islands.

The Russians replied that it was not a question of the ancient boundaries of Finland, but of a new frontier between Sweden and Russia which the latter considered indispensable.

When Stedingk and his colleague Skjöldebrand refused to abandon Aaland, negotiations were broken off and a messenger despatched to Stockholm. Fresh instructions, dated 31st August, contained the surrender of the Diet and Council of State to the Russian demands. The Plenipotentiaries could give up Aaland, and were only to ask that no fortifications or naval building yards should be established there.

On his side, Roumiantzoff had written to the Czar advising him to refuse the undertaking not to fortify Aaland as an intolerable limitation of the Russian power. But he advised him to grant Sweden a better frontier in the North.

Alexander, in agreement with his adviser on the question of fortifications, persisted in claiming as frontier the River Tornea with the town of the same name.

Negotiations were re-opened on 5th September. It was on that day that Roumiantzoff, in the course of the debate, uttered the phrase attributed to Caulaincourt which characterises the strategic value of the Archipelago: "To keep Finland without the Aaland Islands was the same thing as taking a safe of which one had thrown away the keys."

It was on the lines laid down by Russia that the peace was signed on the 17th September.

The Ambassadors of the new King of Sweden, Charles XIII, at the Court of Napoleon, Essen and Lagerbielke, tried afterwards to obtain the support of the Imperial Government for the return of Aaland. They forwarded to the Duke of Cadore, Minister of Foreign Affairs, a memorandum wherein all the motives which Sweden had for claiming the Archipelago were set forth. The Minister replied that Russia, in taking possession of the Aaland Islands, had gone beyond positive engagements she had made towards the Emperor and that she had been made to feel this. Two years later, Napoleon repeated this statement in the instructions addressed to Baron Alquier, his Minister at Stockholm. On the eve of the campaign which he was meditating against Russia, he had good reasons for wishing to secure the sympathies of Sweden, after having allowed her to be despoiled.

¹ Cf. Sam Clason: "Gustav IV Adoif och Europeiske Krisen under Napoleon" — *Freden i Fredrikshamn* (Stockholm, 2nd edition, 1913).

By Article 4 of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, the King of Sweden ceded to the Emperor of Russia the Governments of Kymmenegård, Nyland and Tavastehus, Åbo and Björneborg *with the Åland Islands*, Savolax and Carelia, Vasa and Uleåborg, as well as a part of Swedish Westrobothnia, as far as the River Tornea. The maritime frontier was to leave the mouth of this river, cut the Gulf of Bothnia and the Åland Sea by a line running through the middle, and rejoin the Gulf of Finland. At an equal distance from the coast, the Islands nearest to the mainland of Åland (fasta Åland) and of Finland were to belong to Russia, and those which adjoined her own coasts to Sweden. Article 6 stated that the King renounced the formulation of any reserves in favour of his former subjects, since the Emperor had guaranteed them the free exercise of their religion, their rights of property and their privileges.

In fact, Alexander had, some time before the conclusion of peace, been in relations with the representatives of Finland. In June 1808 he had invited a deputation composed of one noble, one burgher, one peasant from each province, and an ecclesiastic for each diocese, to proceed to St. Petersburg, where they stayed from November 1808 to January 1809, having as their principal spokesman, Barton Mannerheim. At the request of this deputation, a Diet of the four Estates of Finland was convoked and met at Borga on the 25th March, 1809, to settle the situation of the country in concert with the Czar. Alexander made a solemn declaration in person to the Assembly by which, as Grand-Duke of Finland, he guaranteed to the Finns the exercise of their religion and the enjoyment of the fundamental laws of their country, as well as all the rights and privileges in conformity with the constitution which each State of the Grand-Duchy and each inhabitant enjoyed separately. The Estates, expressing their gratitude, swore an oath of fidelity to the Sovereign, recognising him as Emperor of all the Russias and Grand-Duke of Finland. They then attended to the affairs of the country. On the 18th June 1809, the Diet was closed with the same solemnity in the presence of the Czar, who, on this occasion, visited his new conquest for the second time.

At the opening of the Diet, Åland had no representative. But in the month of May following, when the privileges of their order were being discussed by the clergy, the Rector Hoeckert was admitted at Borga as deputy of the Åland clergy. The legality of his mandate is a question which is the subject of vigorous disputes between the Swedish and Finnish authors, as his election did not take place in accordance with the usual forms. On the other hand, there is also a dispute with regard to the validity of that of the Dean and Pastor Olof Hambroeus, who was chosen by the Chapter of Upsala as representing the same clergy of Åland in the Riksdag at Stockholm, where he sat the following year.

Whatever may be the facts in this controversy the important thing to note by reason of the political and juridical consequences which ensue therefrom, are the two historical events which followed one another at a distance of a few months in 1809, the Diet of Borga and the Treaty of Fredrikshamn. The first gave birth to the Grand-Duchy of Finland, an autonomous and constitutional State, bound to Russia under the sovereignty of the Emperor Grand-Duke. The second confirmed this creation as far as Sweden was concerned and fixed the frontiers in which the Åland Islands were included. The King ceded them to the Czar at the same time as the other provinces which composed the new State. The vicissitudes of the war, after an age-long rivalry which had become more and more unequal, had deprived the Kingdom, where reigned the last of the Vasas, of the whole of the mainland and the whole of the Archipelago which he possessed east of the Åland Sea. The Russian sovereignty was to last there for 108 years within the same geographical limits.

FINLAND AND RUSSIA FROM 1809 TO 1914.

During their union with Russia, the Finnish people — Finnish-speaking as well as Swedish-speaking — attained a degree of culture and civilisation which was considerably greater than that of the populations ruled over by the autocratic power of the Romanoffs. This is because this people had grown up in an atmosphere of liberty and because their political education took place under one of the most liberal regimes which existed in Europe at that time — the Swedish constitution. It must not be forgotten that it is to Sweden that they owed their free institutions granted them by the Russian conqueror. The former Kings of Sweden had generously granted their Swedish and Finnish subjects in the Finnish provinces — nobles, clergy, burghers and peasants — the right of representation in the Diet of the Kingdom just as if they had been in the mother-country, and to express their wishes and air their grievances there, to vote their taxes and imposts. This liberty in the past gave the Finnish people the privileged position which they enjoyed in the Empire of the Czars. Accustomed to respect for law and order by their Swedish traditions, and passionately devoted to their institutions, they gave their foreign sovereigns no motive for suspecting their loyalty, as long as they kept their word to respect their privileges and their rights.

The Government of the Grand-Duchy was prompt to take the initiative in measures for the development of the material prosperity of the country. In the reign of Nicholas I new towns were founded and schools of agriculture and commerce organised. The country displayed a vigorous literary and scientific activity, and produced savants and writers of note. Under Alexander II a system of national education was established. It was at this date that a Finnish Nationalist Party came into being in political life — the Fennomanes — whose founder was Yrjö Forsman, and this party gained the majority in the Diet in the Estates of the clergy and of the peasants. Its adversary was the liberal party, which became the Swedish party. The question of the official language and that of public instruction caused heated struggles between the parties, but did not prevent the Finnish language from coming more and more into use, while at the same time it took shape as a literary language.

The relations of the Grand-Duchy with its Russian sovereigns can be divided into two periods. The first lasted for eighty years, in the course of which the Czars made no attempts to curtail the liberties which Alexander I had promised his new subjects that they should enjoy. In the second, the efforts made by the Imperial Government to russify Finland provoked conflicts between it, the Senate and the Diet, which lasted until the world war of 1914, with a single momentary lull of two years and a-half.

In 1809 Alexander had proclaimed the indissoluble union of the two nations — the Russian and the Finnish. This proclamation made before the Diet of Borga, constituted not merely a promise, but a contract. Finland not having had its own constitution, the Swedish constitution which she enjoyed, like other Swedish provinces, in virtue of the laws of 1772 and 1789¹, became a fundamental law of the Grand-Duchy and made it a State which was different from Russia. The sole prerogatives which the suzerainty of the Czar retained for itself consisted of the right to regulate the succession to the Grand-Ducal throne in accordance with the succession to the Imperial crown, and in the direction of foreign policy. Finland was a constitutional State united to a State which had an absolute government. This State had all the attributes of sovereignty, except as far as her external relations and the defence of the Empire were concerned: a Constitution, legislation and regular government. The Diet voted taxes. Without its assent the Czar could not cede any portion of Finnish territory.

The Government was exercised by a Council which some years later (1826) received the name of Senate. It had control of all affairs, with the exception of those in which the Sovereign had the sole decision. A Governor-General was appointed to watch over the interests of Russians in the Grand-Duchy. The means of communications between the Czar and the Senate was a Minister or a special Secretary of State for Finland, residing at the Court of His Imperial Majesty and assisted by a Committee for Finnish Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was common to both countries, and the Russian Minister of War possessed special powers for the defence of the country.

The fundamental law of the Grand-Duchy could not be altered except by the consent of the nation.

Among the duties of the Governor-General was the nomination of police officials, and he presided in the Senate. In the case of disagreement between him and the members of the Government, the Czar had the deciding voice.

All the acts of Alexander, a liberal autocrat, proved that he had a sincere desire to govern the Finns as a free nation and to assure them the right to political existence. His goodwill towards them showed itself especially in the reunion with the Grand-Duchy in 1821 of the Province of Viborg, which had been conquered by the Russians in the previous century, and which received the same constitutional rights as the other provinces. However, under the influence of the conservative ideas which overcame him little by little, Alexander delayed summoning the Diet anew, although its convocation had been demanded on several occasions.

Nicholas I, who was more autocratic than his brother, nevertheless respected Finnish autonomy just as he had done, but he instituted a severe censorship of newspapers and books. The reign of his successor, Alexander II, was the Golden Age of Russian sovereignty for the Finns. The Diet was convoked afresh at Helsingfors for periodical sessions, after an interval of fifty years, and the Emperor opened it himself in the month of September 1863. Finnish became one of the official languages: Finland had her own coinage and her own army, after the Diet had adopted conscription. The Finns have erected a statue to Alexander II in one of the squares of the capital as a token of their gratitude.

¹ Cf. The Constitution of August 21st, 1772, and the Acts of Union and Surety of 21st, February and 3rd April, 1789.

The first years of the reign of Alexander III seemed to promise the Grand-Duchy a continuation of this cloudless sky: the intervals between the sessions of the Diet were even reduced from five years to three years; but soon the reactionary spirit of the Court and the unitary tendencies of the Ministers of the Czar showed themselves openly hostile to the political liberties of this small democracy, isolated in the neighbourhood of the great Russian autocracy. The first step was taken by placing the Finnish Post Office under the control of the Russian Department of the Interior.

The idea of russifying the Grand-Duchy as a province of the Empire, by making a clean sweep of its constitution, was conceived by the Imperial bureaucracy. Its execution commenced in earnest four years after the succession of Nicholas II to the throne, and was entrusted to Lieut.-General Bobrikoff, as Governor-General, while by a breach of the constitutional Covenant, the office of Secretary of State for Finland was given to the Russian Minister of the Interior, von Plehve. In 1899 the Emperor published a manifesto in which he stated that the Russian legislative organ should have the sole deciding voice in questions common to the Governments of both countries. This was the first step on the road to russification. A new Russian law with regard to military service was consequently presented to the Diet at Helsingfors, to be registered by it without opposition.

The Diet protested and in its reply affirmed that its duty was not merely to express an opinion but also to pass laws. The Emperor took no notice of this and on his own authority decreed military service for Finland in conformity with Russian law. But this law could not be enforced: the young men refused to obey it and fled. In 1901 an address, with 100,000 signatures attached, was taken to St. Petersburg by a deputation begging Nicholas to change his policy. He did not consent to receive it: he suppressed the Finnish Army and replaced it by a monetary contribution. Thereupon passive resistance was organised throughout the country under the direction of the most prominent members of the two parties, Swedish and Finnish. Bobrikoff exiled several of them to Russia, but he was killed on the steps of the staircase of the Senate by a fanatical patriot, Eugen Schauman, who thereupon shot himself (June, 1904).

The following year, after the revolt in Moscow, the great strike which broke out in Russia and threatened to extend to Finland changed the plans of Nicholas. He published a new manifesto suspending the illegal decree which he had made since 1899 and promised the Finns an electoral regime based on universal suffrage. This very radical reform was voted in 1905/06 by the last Diet of the four Estates. A single Chamber replaced it. Every citizen, whether male or female, over 26 years of age, had the franchise and was eligible for election. Finland was in advance of all the other countries of Europe in calling upon its female population to the exercise of political rights.

The Czar had also instituted a pseudo-liberal régime in Russia after the unsuccessful war against Japan. Instead of the sympathy which Finland might have expected from the new advisers of Nicholas, she only received evidence of their hostility which took the shape of preparatory measures aiming at the gradual extinction of her independent constitution. Like the bureaucrats of absolute monarchy, Stolypine was haunted by the idea of a Great Russia completely unified — an idea which was dear to so many Russians, whatever their political opinions — and he made use of nationalist feeling as an instrument of government. After the regulations and manifesto of 1908 had forced the members of the Senate to resign, he replaced them by ex-officers who had served in the Russian army and were strangers to the administration. In June, 1910, he had a law passed by the Duma of the Empire which laid down that in all matters which concerned Finland the Duma was to have legislative power, and that four representatives of the Finnish Diet and two of the Senate were to be elected to defend their point of view before it. To this disregard for its rights the Diet gave the same reply which it had made to the Emperor eleven years before "that it had not only to give its opinion, but also to make the laws."

Nevertheless, a number of laws were passed by the Duma in violation of the contract concluded by the Czars with the Grand-Duchy. One of them placed Russians on an equal footing with Finns as candidates for office in Finland. Nothing was more fair in principle than this equality. Ever since 1809 Finnish subjects had been admitted to the service of the Empire, in which some of them had attained to the highest dignities. It seemed natural that reciprocity should exist in favour of their neighbours; but Russian nationalism proposed to impose the law of equality, as voted by the Duma, as an act of authority. As the Finnish Courts of Justice refused to apply this foreign legislation, the Imperial Government had recourse to unjustifiable measures of coercion. All the members of the Courts of Appeal were arrested, transported to Russia and condemned to severe terms of imprisonment by the Russian Courts, by virtue of a law which brought before these Courts the officials who opposed russification.

Such was the state of the conflict between the two countries at the beginning of the year 1914.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF FINLAND.

The war brought no modification in the system of violence adopted by the Russian Government with regard to Finland. It only made matters still more intolerable, as the economic conditions became more difficult and the supply of products from abroad more scarce. The Imperial Government declared its resolution not to convoke the Diet throughout the war, passed an edict for taxation of its own accord and published a complete programme of russification.

Thus, it is not surprising that the Finnish people whose former loyalty had disappeared under oppression, had a burning wish for the defeat of Russia. If vanquished, she would no doubt be forced to recognise the autonomy or even the complete independence of Finland. If victorious, nothing would have prevented her from pursuing her policy to the end. On the other side, Germany as the enemy of Russia appeared from afar to the Finns in the light of a liberating power. Thus a number of young men secretly proceeded to Prussia to receive military training there, and to fight on the eastern front against the oppressors of their country. A Jaeger Battalion was formed. This eventually rendered considerable service to the army of General Mannerheim, which was short of well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers. But their enrolment amongst the enemies of Russia contributed to the increase of the hardships which Finland had to undergo. Imprisonment or exile was the fate of a number of opponents, amongst whom was a former President of the Diet, M. Svinhufvud, who was deported to Siberia.

The Russian Revolution of March 1917 put an end to this despotism. What legal consequences was the disappearance of the Tzarist monarchy to have for the ex-Grand-Duchy? Moreover, what were to be the bonds of union between this country and the new Republic? The predominant opinion amongst the Finns was that Finland was united to the Russian Empire and not to the person of the Emperor. The provisional Government at Petrograd was invested with the same powers as the Emperor; the union continued, but it was thought that the situation could only be a provisional one. Pending its establishment, the new Russian Government recognised the political autonomy of Finland and sent another Governor-General to Helsinki who assembled the Diet and opened negotiations with the Socialist majority, who favoured an understanding, leaving the control of foreign affairs and military matters to Russia. These negotiations lasted up till the Soviet revolution. When the Diet voted a new Constitution reserving a more extensive autonomy for Finland on the 18th July, it was dissolved by the Kerensky Government.

The elections which took place on the 4th October gave a majority of ten out of two hundred to the different parties united against the Socialist party. The latter, after protesting against the dissolution, nevertheless took part in the ballot, and the numbers elected sat and voted in the new Chamber.

However, the economic situation was becoming worse from day to day. Living became more and more expensive in the towns, which favoured the troubles stirred up by the extreme elements. Disorder was increased by the presence of numerous Russian troops quartered throughout the country who fraternised with the disturbers of the peace. Thus the conviction that the security and future of Finland would be assured only by complete severance from Russia took a firm hold of opinion among the Finns and particularly in the Swedish party, which aimed at independence.

Meanwhile, the coup d'état of the 7th November overthrew the Kerensky Government in Petrograd and delivered the Republic into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Finnish Senate, considering that there was no longer any authority in Russia and that complete anarchy reigned there, proclaimed the independence of Finland on the 4th December. The Diet approved this Declaration and appointed a Directory, composed of three members, to assume power — M. Svinhufvud, President of the Senate, and MM. Gripenberg and Passiviki, who were Senators.

On the 15th November the Soviet Government had published its Declaration on the right of the foreign peoples of Russia to dispose of themselves. It had then only to leave Finland a free decision on its own destiny. But this was not the intention of Lenin and his colleagues, who knew full well that the social revolution would not ripen and attain its full strength except by propaganda abroad and by becoming universal.

For this reason the Russian troops in Finland, who were converts to Bolshevism, received instructions to intervene actively in assistance of the revolutionary movement which was spreading through the country and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Red Guard were formed almost everywhere and instructed by Russian officers. A general strike broke out in November and was the signal for terrorist outbreaks and attacks by means of which the Revolution on the Soviet model was to be imposed.

During this time the Svinhufvud Ministry was occupied in obtaining the recognition of the independence of Finland by foreign Powers, in ridding the country of

the Russian troops, and in making sure of the food supply. But before accomplishing this triple task they had to struggle against a formidable insurrection.

The independence of Finland was recognised by the Soviet Government on the 2nd January, 1918, thanks, it would appear, to the intervention of the Finnish Socialists. Two days later it was recognised by Sweden and by France, and on the 6th January by Germany. Afterwards came the recognition by Norway and Denmark on the 10th January, and by Switzerland on the 20th February.

The Russian troops stationed in the new State were composed of the 42nd Corps of the late Imperial Army, now transformed into a Red Army of Workmen and Peasants. Far from ordering their retreat, Lenin and Trotsky hastened to replace as fast as possible regiments who were recalled by fresh units, and despatched to their comrades in Finland whole trains of arms and munitions. The phrase attributed to Lenin, « Russia is in the course of reconquering Finland and of attaching her to herself more closely than ever, » fully betrays his ideas. One might well say that the insurrection of the 25th January, 1918, was the work of the Soviets, and that they availed themselves of the Socialist Party and the Finnish Red Guards and workmen as more or less conscious agents, who, without the aid of Russia, would not have possessed the necessary material forces.

On their side the legal Government only disposed of a civic guard which was in the process of formation. Finland no longer possessed an army after its suppression by Nicholas II — nothing but ex-officers who were animated by fervent patriotism.

The White Guard, so-called in opposition to the Red Guard, had, to begin with, no more than 2,000 rifles, but its military value was far greater than that of the Russian soldiers who were affected by the general spirit of demoralisation. As for the Red Guards, who were brave, like all Finns, they constituted a force ready to put up a determined resistance.

The insurrectionary movement commenced at Viborg and in a few days the Reds were masters of the greater part of the country. Their triumph was marked by acts of savagery and murder. A revolutionary government was established at Helsingfors under the presidency of one Manner, Socialist ex-president of the Diet.

But Finland did not remain without a legal government. The Svinhufvud Ministry had been surprised by the outbreak of the Communist rising, so that its chief was not at once able to leave Helsingfors, where he succeeded in hiding. His colleagues took refuge in the north, and later reassembled at Vasa, where they organised the resistance. Though there was no lack of volunteers to maintain the struggle against the Reds, they were very short of arms and munitions. However, they at once succeeded in finding the man capable of quelling the insurrection in General Mannerheim, an ex-officer of the Imperial Guard, who had commanded an Army Corps on the Russian front with distinction. Him they invested with extraordinary powers. An army was levied in accordance with the recruiting law of 1878 and after several weeks Ostrobothnia was delivered. But even then the situation appeared so desperate to all champions of order, with the exception of Mannerheim himself, that they looked abroad in search of assistance and turned, quite naturally, first of all, in the direction of Sweden.

In this country there was a strong feeling of opposition to the idea of intervention in Finland. A large part of the population considered the Finnish Civil war if anything as a class struggle rather than a battle to the death between legal order and communist anarchy. For its part the Government feared that the entry of Sweden into the conflict might plunge it in the world conflagration, and was consequently firmly resolved on the maintenance of its neutrality. The Cabinet, presided over by M. Eden, was therefore unwilling to authorise either the organisation of a body of troops to proceed to Finland or the delivery of a consignment of arms detained by the State, or the exportation and transit of others purchased abroad, as they could be transported by sea just as well. But other roads of an amicable nature were open. When the representative of the Vasa Government at Stockholm, M. Gripenberg, came to him on the 4th February, 1918, to demand the armed intervention of Sweden, M. Eden replied by an offer of mediation, with the object of effecting a reconciliation between the two parties at war and the re-establishment of peace. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish Government.

It may be asked if the effective co-operation of Sweden in the repression of the Red revolution would not have rendered the subsequent amicable settlement of the Aaland question easier, as it was not a source of contention between the two States in the month of February 1918. This is, however, only a hypothesis, such as is sometimes formed at a later date, and it is not our duty to discuss it in our report.

The Vasa Government hesitated to appeal to Germany. It was fully aware of the consequences which the military support of this Power might have on the future of the young State in the terrible crisis in which its existence was at stake. The only things which General Mannerheim wished to accept from Germany were arms and munitions, in which his soldiers were totally deficient. He strained every effort

thereupon to crush the insurrection. Fear of exposing a great part of the country to their cruelty and reprisals in a struggle which might be of long duration no doubt outweighed every other consideration of the patriots, who felt that the weight of this responsibility was on their shoulders.

Already in November 1917, M. Hjelt, the representative of the Finnish Government in Berlin, had visited the German General Headquarters and concluded a Convention for the evacuation of Finland by the Russian troops, and to secure the arms and the return home of the Battalion of Finnish Jaegers. But von Kühlmann, the Secretary of State, suspended the execution of this arrangement, as he was unwilling to do anything which might retard the conclusion of peace with Soviet Russia which was then imminent. It was only on the 8th February, 1918, that contracts regarding the delivery of arms to Finland were signed. On the 15th February the Battalion of Jaegers embarked for Vasa. Four days later, M. Hjelt was authorised to approach the Government of the Kaiser on the subject of military aid which it might be disposed to give the Finnish State and for which a small number of troops would suffice. In a fresh interview with General Ludendorff, February 21st, he learnt from the Quartermaster-General that the Supreme Command, in view of the information it had received on the situation in Finland, had drawn up a plan for an expedition to save it from the violence of the Bolsheviks and the Reds. Operations were to commence by a disembarkation at Aaland and to continue on the mainland after the despatch of several battalions across the ice. The German troops would operate separately, but in concert with those of General Mannerheim. The despatch of warships to Aaland could take place the following week.

On the 3rd March, Trotsky signed the Peace Treaty at Brest-Litovsk with the German Delegates, of which Article 6 stipulated that the Russian troops were to evacuate Finland and the Aaland Islands without delay and that the Russian naval forces, were, at the same time, to leave the Finnish ports. This engagement was not kept. The Soviet Government continued secretly to support the Finnish insurrection, which had turned into pure Bolshevism. The breach of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk furnished Germany with a means of justifying her military intervention: the Wilhelmstrasse protested against the despatch of reinforcements to the Red Guards in a Note addressed to Petrograd on the 30th March.

Before this, on the 6th March, a German squadron had disembarked 1,200 men on the Aaland Island, which was chosen as the base of operations. The main force, consisting of a Division commanded by General von der Goltz, commenced at Hango and after clearing the south-west of Finland of revolutionary forces, entered Helsingfors on the 12th April. The fortress of Sveaborg had surrendered without firing a shot, and the Russian warship fled on seeing the German flag.

By far the greater and harder task was reserved for the Finnish White Guards and their Commander-in-Chief. The Army of the Government began to move towards the middle of March, having as its objective the city of Tammerfors, an important railway junction where the Russians and the Reds had concentrated means of defence and forces, amounting to about 80,000 men. Tammerfors was captured on the 5th April after sanguinary fighting. General Mannerheim continued his victorious operations and reconquered the whole country from west to east, leaving the Germans to occupy the region of the south.

On the 7th March, as the price of the aid which it was to receive, the Finnish Government had concluded a Treaty of Peace at Berlin, by which Finland engaged herself not to cede to any foreign Power any portion of her territory, nor to consent to any servitude on her sovereign rights without a previous agreement with Germany, and also a Treaty of Commerce on the model of that which had just been signed between Germany and the Ukraine. These two treaties were annulled by the Peace of Versailles. After his return to Helsingfors, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Stenroth, successfully opposed the conclusion of a military alliance proposed by the Imperial Government and contrived to give efficacious protection to the nationals of the Entente. But the Senate, who were partisans of a monarchical restoration, favoured the candidature of Prince Frederic Charles of Hesse, the brother-in-law of William II, whom the Diet elected King of Finland on the 9th October. The defeat of Germany, who was compelled to beg for an armistice from the Allies in the following month, caused this Prince to decide to renounce the crown which had been offered to him.

The military aid of Germany had assisted Finland to deliver herself from the clutches of Bolshevism: the victory of the Allies rid her of German tutelage. Both were equally a menace to her independence, which from this date had nothing further to fear.

THE AALAND ISLANDS DURING THE CIVIL WAR IN FINLAND.

During the first three years of the war the Russian troops in occupation of the Aaland Islands maintained strict discipline and the population did not suffer from

their presence, although obliged to perform forced labour for the construction of fortifications erected in the Archipelago against a possible German attack. The latter was confined to the appearance of a few ships and Zeppelins, which fired some shots and threw bombs at the lighthouses.

The first effect of the Revolution in Petrograd was the relaxation of discipline among the soldiers quartered in Aaland, who began to pillage and make exactions at the expense of the inhabitants. But the Revolution gave the Aalanders hope of a speedy emancipation, just as it did their fellow-citizens on the mainland. On the 20th August, 1917, delegates of the Communes met at Finström to deliberate on the situation. These discussions resulted in the expression of a wish; not for independence shared with their brothers in Finland, but for reincorporation with Sweden on the conclusion of peace, as the procès-verbal of the meeting bears witness. The Assembly appointed a delegation of four members to bring its decisions to the notice of the Swedish Government and Parliament.

However, the delegation was not then able to fulfil its mandate. A committee of Aalanders was constituted during the following months with a view to organising a public expression of opinion, to indicate the wish of the inhabitants in the most decisive fashion. It took place between the 20th and 25th December, in the form of an address to the King and the people of Sweden, signed by 7,135 men and women, of at least 21 years of age and domiciled in the Islands. The result of this referendum was made public in a new assembly held at Finström, and there it was decided to send the address to its high destination. The text of this document refers to the attachment of the Aalanders for Sweden, which the separation of 1809 had not succeeded in extinguishing, and ends with the hope that a solution of the difficulties which might stand in the way of the realisation of their desire could be found by the King and his Government in concert with a free and independent Finland. The deputation put the address in the hands of His Majesty on the 3rd February, 1918. In his reply, the Sovereign also expressed the desire that the question should be resolved in agreement with Finland, for that was the best course which could be followed. The King had already made himself the mouth-piece of this desire in a speech made at the opening of the Riksdag on the preceding 16th January. He then expressed his conviction that the independence of Finland would facilitate a satisfactory solution of the Aaland question.

With regard to the first impression made at Stockholm by the step taken by the Aalanders, the Royal Government has declared, as M. Branting has confirmed in conversation with us, that the feeling was one of surprise.

At the request of the inhabitants, who were terrified by the violence of the Russian troops, the Swedish Cabinet prepared an expedition to assist them. The news which had reached Sweden had painted the picture in the darkest colours, and they therefore resolved to put an end to this state of affairs, deciding on intervention for reasons which were purely humanitarian in character. The head of the expedition, Captain Akermarck, was instructed to transport to Sweden such Swedish subjects and Aaland Islanders as were desirous of leaving the Islands.

He appeared in Aaland on the 14th February with two vessels and was joined by the armed cruiser *Thor* commanded by Captain Stark. At the same time, on the demand of the Swedish Government, the Soviet representative at Stockholm, M. Vorowsky, proceeded to Mariehamn in order to induce the Russian soldiers to evacuate the Archipelago. Immediately on the arrival of the Swedes, negotiations were commenced. The Russian soldiery agreed to be disarmed and sent to Russia. But in the meantime a troop of White Guards, made up of some 500 or 600 young men had arrived at Aaland, who being only in possession of a few rifles and in danger of being surrounded by the Red Guards at Nystadt, had crossed over the ice to the Archipelago. A hundred or so Aalanders joined them and they set about disarming the Russians, who numbered at least 2,000 men. They made bold attacks on a number of posts and captured the arms of the defenders.

It was the duty of the Swedish officer, in accordance with the pacific character of his mission, to try to prevent bloodshed and the dangerous consequences which an apparently unequal struggle might involve for the population of Aaland. But the Russians refused to depart unless the White Guards did the same. After long pour-parlers the latter, acting on the advice which was telegraphed to them by the representative of the Finnish Government in Stockholm, M. Gripenberg, accepted the conditions of Captain Akermarck. From Sweden they were sent to Finland by the land route. As for the Russians, owing to lack of tonnage, only a part of them were sent to Riga, and the remainder were interned in Sweden. The Aaland Islanders who witnessed these incidents sent an address of thanks to the White Guards at a meeting of the citizens held at Feltwick. Nevertheless the Commander of the Guards was brought before a court-martial by order of General Mannerheim, which acquitted him after having heard his explanations.

The simultaneous removal of the two adversaries, Russians and Finns, has provoked discussions into which it is impossible for us to enter. They are further complicated by the fact that the only telegraphic communication between the

White Guards on Aaland and the Finnish Government at Vasa was by way of Stockholm. The Swedish Cabinet acted as intermediary: it estimated the gravity of the situation in the Archipelago on the basis of the reports from the officers whom it had sent there. If its opinion was not in accordance with that of the Finns, we consider this due to a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the circumstances, but from which, however, one cannot deduce any conclusions in support of the alleged inertia on the part of the Vasa Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the White Guards. We shall return to this subject later.

The sudden appearance, a fortnight later, on the 6th March, of a German squadron was a surprise for Aaland. There was no conflict between the Swedes and the newcomers. The former were concentrated at Mariehamn and on the western part of the Island, where they remained until the 16th May. By this time their mission of policing the island and maintaining peace was accomplished. They were replaced by a Finnish garrison, which had been preceded in the middle of March by the despatch of a Military Governor. The Berlin Cabinet had hastened to dispel the conjectures to which the disembarkation of German soldiers had given rise in Stockholm. Their Minister in this capital was instructed to declare that Germany had no selfish aims against the Islands, and that she would not prevent Sweden from accomplishing her humanitarian aims, but that she was of the opinion that the Aaland question could only be settled by a strict understanding with herself.

The Aalanders also marked the arrival of the Germans with displeasure, while that of the Swedes had been welcomed by them with joy. They were cold in their reception of these strangers, who requisitioned their cattle and their potatoes and themselves fixed the purchase price payable in marks, while their Swedish friends furnished them in abundance and at a low price with goods of which they were in want. The measure taken with regard to the Islands by the Finnish Government in constituting them a separate province, on the 8th March, with a civil and military governor, did not create a more conciliatory feeling. On the contrary, now that their fear of the Russians was removed, they entered more and more upon the road which they hoped would lead to separation. They addressed an appeal simultaneously to the Finnish Senate, to the King of Sweden and to the German Emperor in three telegrams signed by fifteen prominent citizens. In these they took their stand in support of their claim for reunion with Sweden on the promise given by Germany and by other belligerent States that peoples delivered from their political servitude during the course of the war should have the right of deciding their future for themselves, and they announced their intention of holding another public expression of opinion while the German and Swedish troops were still on the Islands. The reply of the Finnish Senate was severe and peremptory: "Far from being willing to discuss a popular movement which had been caused by the disembarkation of Swedish troops without the consent of Finland, they gave the signatories a severe warning that no action on their part against the integrity of the national territory would be tolerated." The King of Sweden in his reply reaffirmed his hope that his Government would find the means of gratifying the wishes of the Islanders. The German Emperor avoided expressing an opinion: he merely wished that the three parties interested should arrive at an understanding.

For several months the Aalanders took no new steps, in view of their uncertainty as to the issue of the war; but they refused to obey the order of the Finnish Government calling the 1892/96 classes to the Colours, and a certain number of them fled to Sweden to avoid military service. When the fortunes of war gave the Allies the final victory, it was towards them that henceforth all hopes were turned. On the eve of the Armistice, petitions were addressed to the President of the United States, the President of the French Republic and the Government of Great Britain by the Executive Committee of the Aaland Landsting, an assembly of delegates of the parishes. The petitioners called upon the victorious Powers to afford them the right of self-determination, which was to be the pivot of all their future claims.

THE QUESTION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS IN 1919-1920.

The development taken by the Islands question during the last two years is too fresh in the memory for it to be necessary for us to retrace it here. We should only be unnecessarily prolonging this historical summary; we shall merely indicate the rôle and attitude adopted by each one of the three parties.

The first thing that strikes us is the tenacity shown by the Aalanders, whom nothing deters or discourages.

Repulsed by the Finnish Senate, their Landsting, whose Executive Committee is at the head of the pro-Swedish movement, sent a delegation to the Peace Conference, organised a second plebiscite in June 1919, more categorical than the former, sent a new address to the King of Sweden, and in 1920 approached the Council of the League of Nations and redoubled the notes and memoranda it submitted. Who could fail to be touched by the expression of popular will in so many forms?

The Finnish Government, surprised by this obstinacy, sought to win over the demonstrators by an important concession. A law was voted by the Diet of Helsingfors which placed the province of Aaland in a special position and granted it autonomy, freeing the population from military service, which it disliked, and replacing it by lighthouse and pilotage services; but the Aalanders would have none of it. To the Prime Minister who came to Mariehamn with his colleagues, the Ministers of War and of Commerce, to explain the provisions of the law of autonomy to the delegates of the parishes, M. Sundblom replied in the name of the Landsting that the Aalanders did not care for this gift and that nothing would make them renounce their demand for a plebiscite. On the following day, the 5th June, 1920, M. Sundblom and M. Björkman, President of the Landsting, were arrested for high treason and conducted to Abo.

The Finnish Government has been reproached for this act of authority and we think that it might have refrained from it as a continued proof of its magnanimous patience, in view of the feeling of uncertainty and trouble caused by the war, and particularly in view of the fact that the separatist movement has never appealed to violence, but has always called for a peaceable solution of the question. However, if the Finnish Government was late in taking coercive measures to forestall or hinder popular manifestations, it was not because it was ever in any doubt as to its rights: on the contrary, it wished to affirm the sovereignty of Finland over the Archipelago to those who denied it, by the arrest of the two leaders of the movement.

With regard to Sweden, she has espoused the cause of her protégés more and more. She had a sort of moral obligation not to repulse a small people of her own blood, who gave such eloquent testimony of their desire for reunion with their former mother-country. After unofficial negotiations with the Helsingfors Government in which, in exchange for a plebiscite on Aaland, she offered to support the rectification of the Finnish frontiers on the Russian side, she passed on to a formal demand that satisfaction should be given to the population of the Island. The long-awaited reply of the Finnish Government was a repetition of the proposals made verbally by General Mannerheim to the Court of Stockholm some months before and which consisted only of an understanding as to the safeguarding of Swedish military interests in Aaland. Sweden had already submitted the question of the Archipelago to the Peace Conference and took a clearly defined position opposed to Finland before the international areopagus, as she did later before the Council of the League of Nations. We are not surprised that the tone reached in the later notes exchanged by the two Governments rendered further discussion impossible.

The arguments of each of the three parties can be summarised as follows:

Aaland claims the right to hold a third plebiscite which could leave no doubt as to the unanimous wish of the population for reunion with Sweden, to whom she is bound by the traditions of her Swedish past and an unswerving affection which has survived a separation of more than a century. This claim is based on the right of people to dispose freely of their own destinies, proclaimed by President Wilson and used to the advantage of several nationalities in the treaties which ended the great war. In justice to the Aaland Islanders, it cannot be too often stated that they have entirely refrained from all actions and demonstrations of a revolutionary nature. Peaceable and law-abiding, they have only employed the means most calculated to gain the sympathies of civilised nations in order to win their case.

Finland refuses to authorise a plebiscite and to recognise its validity, in virtue of the sovereign rights of the Finnish State on its own territory. Aspirations which envisage the possibility of a change from the *status quo* are not well founded, she argues, and the principle of self-determination cannot be applied in the case of the Aaland Islands. Finland holds to this juridical field, where she considers that nothing can shake her position.

Sweden has no selfish rights to maintain with regard to the Islands, neither does she hold annexationist views, but she considers the wish of the Aalanders to be legitimate, and claims on their behalf the right to hold a public expression of opinion in accordance with a principle which is universally recognised. She is moved by the profound interest aroused by men of her own race and by the fear that their fate may be a precarious and unhappy one if they remain tied to another nationality.

III.

COMPETENCE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

At a meeting of the 20th September, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, having studied the report made at its request and in a consultative capacity by an International Commission of Jurists, in accordance with the conclusions of this

report, declared itself competent to recommend the solution which it considered as most equitable and most appropriate to the question of the Aaland Islands.

We have been delegated to present it, after the necessary consultations, with a report upon which it could base a recommendation of a nature calculated to establish conditions favourable to the maintenance of peace in this part of the world by an arrangement, whether final or provisional, taking the legitimate interests of all parties in the case into consideration.

The enquiry which we have made, by virtue of this mandate, has given us the absolute conviction that the only method to adopt in order to obtain a solution of the question in accordance with these lofty views, is to entrust it to impartial examination by the Council. It is therefore within its rights in declaring its competence. Although we cannot share the opinion stated by the Commission of Jurists on all points, we agree with their declaration that the Aaland question is one that extends beyond the sphere of domestic policy. But, in our opinion, it is because it had acquired such considerable international importance that it was necessary to submit it to the high authority which the League of Nations represents in the eyes of the world. On its equitable settlement depend, not only the re-establishment of the spirit of peace where feeling has been running high among this interesting Baltic population, and the resumption of the good relations which should exist between two nations which have all the conditions for a mutual understanding, Sweden and Finland, but also the consolidation of the peace which the population of this part of Europe need as much as others to efface the deep traces left by the war, to reconstitute their forces of production and to establish their economic development upon solid foundations.

Without losing sight of these considerations, we come first of all to this statement; the primary question at issue, and which no ethnical or political considerations allow to be brushed aside, is a legal one — that of Finland's right of sovereignty with regard to the Aaland Islands.

The summary we have made of the successive transformations through which Finland has passed has shown that more than a hundred years ago this country was constituted a Grand-Duchy under a sovereign who was at once Emperor of Russia and Grand Duke. We shall first of all see whether Finland was a sovereign State after the dissolution of the bonds which attached her to Russia, and, secondly, whether her sovereignty extended over the Aaland Islands just as over the other parts of her territory.

WAS FINLAND A SOVEREIGN STATE AFTER HER DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ?

As we have seen, the Grand-Duchy was an autonomous State under the Russian regime, granted its own constitution, and enjoying the attributes of sovereignty, with the exception of the direction of foreign policy and national defence, possessing its legislation, its Parliament, its Government (the Senate), its army, its finances, a separate judicial organisation, and clearly defined frontiers, which, in accordance with the Constitution, could only be modified by the consent of the Diet. The latter, the Diet composed of four Estates, sacrificed itself in the reign of Nicholas II to make way for a single Chamber, elected upon the broadest basis of universal suffrage, and the national representation as it exists to-day is based upon the system adopted during the Russian period.

But it may be objected that the last of the Romanoffs did everything to destroy the autonomy of the Grand-Duchy. For a regime of liberty he substituted a regime of repression. He treated Finland from 1899 as an ordinary province of his Empire. This opinion does not bear a critical examination. To begin with, Nicholas II did not dare to pronounce the abrogation of the Finnish Constitution: rather, he sought to sap its foundations and reduce it to nothing. Little by little, after some years of sterile effort, he decided on wiser courses and recalled the illegal measures which he had taken. His Minister, Stolypine, renewed the attempt in the same spirit, but by other means, by placing the legislative power of the Duma of the Empire above that of the Finnish Assembly. A usurpation is not valid unless it is complete and is recognised by its victims. In this instance, again, Finland did not yield, did not submit in spite of persecutions, and one of the first acts of the Kerensky Government when it succeeded to the monarchy of the Romanoffs, was to recognise the autonomy of the late Grand-Duchy. Thus it was an autonomous Finland which, some time afterwards, on the 6th December, 1917, proclaimed her full and entire independence of Russia, detached herself from the latter by an act of her own free will, and became thereafter herself a sovereign State instead of a dependent State. Far from putting any obstacle in her way, the Soviet Republic, the only existing *de facto* power in Russia, hastened to recognise her as independent-keeping her hands free, nevertheless, for a subsequent attempt to make her neighbour a Soviet Republic.

A subsidiary question has been raised, which presents great interest by reason of the conclusions which it involves: was a new State founded thereby? The

jurists and politicians of Finland cannot allow this, and they give good reasons for it. The declaration of independence had broken the bonds of the country with Russia, but the Constitution, which differentiated it from the other parts of the Empire of the Czars, remained. All the fundamental principles on which it had been established remained intact. The only change was the extinction of the bonds with Russia. Thus a new regime was created in Finland, but not a new State, without the loss of a yard of the national territory to another Power.

To this immediate transformation is opposed the argument of the chaotic transition which ensued from the revolutionary outbreaks. It is stated that the interior situation of Finland was of such a nature after the declaration of independence that for a long time the conditions necessary for the formation of a sovereign State were not in existence. The Red revolution provoked anarchy, the civil war was raging, in which the Russians, and at the last moment the German troops also, took part. A stable political organisation could not have been created without the assistance of forces from outside, and it was only at the close of the civil war in May 1918 that order and social peace were finally restored and that the Finnish Republic was born as a definitely constituted sovereign State.

We shall reply to this argument that the legal Government, appointed by the Diet before its dispersion by the insurrection, never ceased to exist throughout a part of the country, even in the midst of the civil war. It took refuge at Vasa, raised an army there, reconquered the provinces one by one and ended by crushing the revolution. The facts are there to prove this. With regard to the fact that it received military aid from abroad, it should be remarked that the communist revolution could not have broken out or been supported except through the continuous assistance of the Russian Bolsheviks, who furnished it with ample forces of officers, soldiers, arms and ammunition. It was this continued support which forced the legal Government to call in the Germans. The sovereignty of the Finnish State was not diminished by the co-operation of Germany. A State does not lose its sovereign rights because it receives outside aid for the re-establishment of its authority. This is proved by numerous examples in history.

As for the later epoch, in the month of May 1918, to which it is sought to assign the birth of Finland as an independent State, we are of opinion that this should be rejected, as this birth in reality dates from the declaration of independence. An historical example may be quoted in support of our theory. The Republic of the United States dates its independence (and no one contradicts this) from the declaration of July 4th, 1776, and not from the day of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, the 3rd September, 1783. For seven years the new States waged a fierce war against their parent country, before the latter resigned herself to recognising them as independent, while the Finnish civil war only lasted a few months.

Is it necessary to press the comparison further and to recall that, in the course of its long struggle, the American Republic also received military aid from abroad, that of Bourbon France?

DOES THE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FINNISH STATE EXTEND TO THE AALAND ISLANDS?

Throughout its union with Russia Finland did not suffer any partition of her territory. On the Swedish side her frontiers remained definitely outlined as traced by the Boundary Convention of 1810 in accordance with the Treaty of Fredrikshamn. On the Russian side, far from being diminished, they were extended by the province of Viborg and the Finnish territory taken by the Russians from the Swedes in 1721 and 1743 and restored to the Grand-Duchy by Alexander I. She attained independence *en bloc*, if we may use this expression, and in this "*bloc*" since 1809 the Aaland Islands were indubitably included. No comparison seems to us to be possible between Finland and the States which came into existence as the result of the defeat of the Russian Empire or the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and whose territorial status could not be defined until the reconstruction of Europe at the conclusion of peace.

The recognition of the Finnish State by the Powers gave her admission into the community of nations, as fulfilling the conditions necessary for this official confirmation of an independent existence, one of the most important of which is the possession of frontiers which are sufficiently determined. However, it has been argued that the question of the recognition of her independence is a different matter from the recognition of her frontiers, in order to declare that reserves have been implied, notably by Sweden, with regard to the Aaland Archipelago.

Sweden refused to recognise Finland as long as she was not detached from Russia, which is in accordance with the principles of international law. When the separation had taken place, Sweden was, with the Soviet Republic, first in notifying recognition. In acting thus, so we were informed as Stockholm, the Swedish Government wished to give her neighbour a conspicuous proof of her sympathy. Had she

confused the frontier question with this recognition, she would have feared that a reserve which was likely to give offence might have insinuated itself into an act which was quite friendly. Other reasons justifying this voluntary omission are set forth in the memorandum from the Swedish Minister to the Commission of Jurists. The Royal Government did not wish to increase the difficulties by raising the Aaland question prematurely, in view of the critical situation which prevailed in Finland. Further, the Archipelago, being occupied by Russian troops, was not in point of fact under the authority of the Finnish Government.

Again, the Swedish Government cherished the hope, when it acknowledged the request of the Aaland delegates some weeks later of finding an amicable solution of the Aaland question in concert with the Government of Helsingfors. But the recognition of Finland by diplomatic act has never implied in spirit the recognition of her frontiers. At no moment has the Swedish Government considered them definitive.

It seems difficult to us to admit that a diplomatic document of this kind can contain a restriction which does not figure in the text. If this were possible, there is none which would not lend itself to varying interpretations leading to controversy. In our opinion, when the Finnish Government had received the official announcement from the Swedish Consul-General on the 6th January, 1918, that "His Majesty the King of Sweden at a Council meeting held on the 4th January had resolved to recognise Finland as an autonomous and independent State," it was justified in believing that this recognition implied no reserve relative to her frontiers and consequently with regard to the Aaland Islands. Further, by the Treaty of Fredrikshamn another Swedish monarch, in his own name and in that of his successors, had renounced the possession of the Archipelago for ever. In notifying her recognition it seems that Sweden saw in the new Republic only a State still in process of formation. But properly speaking, from a geographical point of view, this State had possessed frontiers which were clearly defined for over a hundred years.

Another Power, Great Britain, while recognising the Finnish State on the 6th May, 1919, followed up her recognition by a Note expressing the hope that Finland would not in any case refuse to accept the decisions of the Peace Conference with regard to her frontiers.

The Peace Conference had entrusted the Commission for Baltic Affairs with the study of the Aaland question. This Commission submitted a memorandum to the Supreme Council. The Conference, which was not at one on the question, recommended the Supreme Council to maintain the prohibition of fortifications on the Islands and to leave to the League of Nations the task of deciding as to the sovereignty. Some months afterwards, on the 21st January, 1920, the British Cabinet advised the Finnish Government that its recognition was no longer accompanied by any reserves.

Whether reserves were implied, as in the case of Sweden, or were stated, as in the case of Great Britain before she withdrew them, the question of recognition has not, in our opinion, the importance which is attached to it. It is overshadowed by the primary question, that of sovereignty over the Aaland Islands.

The principal argument presented against the Finnish right of sovereignty has been based on the military incidents which took place on the islands and the arrangements which were made for their evacuation. After the declaration of independence, Russian soldiers continued to occupy the Archipelago and the Vasa Government made no effort, it is stated, to drive them away. It was the Swedish expedition which accomplished this object: had it not done so, the German squadron would have dealt with the matter. It follows from this that as far as the Aaland Islands were concerned, in the case of Finland there existed what has been called "veritable lack of sovereignty."

This allegation appears to us to be devoid of foundation. It cannot be doubted that the commander of the Swedish expedition which removed the White Guards in order to put an end to this struggle against the Russian soldiery was prompted by humanitarian sentiment, but it cannot be concluded from this that they would have been incapable of victory over adversaries whose morale was corrupted by the revolution. When one knows General Mannerheim, it is impossible to question his wish to re-establish Finnish authority in Aaland by force, as he instructed the White Guards, in a telegram which the Swedish Government did not think that they ought to transmit to them, to hold on until the arrival of a convoy of arms of which he announced the despatch. Everything points to belief in his final success. It is in any case inaccurate to say that the Finnish Government, represented in this matter by the Commander-in-Chief of its troops, did not make any serious effort to expel the Russian hordes.

These hordes were on the Islands, but they were also found in the south of Finland until the end of the insurrection. The existence of Finnish sovereignty during the insurrectionary period has not been contested except over the Aaland Archipelago. It seems to have been forgotten that, in accordance with the principles

of international law, the fact that a country is occupied for a space of time by the enemy does not mean that the State thus temporarily dispossessed loses its right of sovereignty over the invaded portions of its territory.

The Swedish expedition had not yet retired, when the Vasa Government, with a view to affirming its sovereignty, sent a Military Governor to Aaland. It performed fresh acts of authority there soon after, in withdrawing the exequatur of the Swedish Vice-Consul and in expelling a Swedish journalist. The Royal Government did not protest in these two cases, but requested an exequatur for another consular agent. Thus, in Helsingfors this request has been considered as an implicit recognition of the rights of Finland.

We will say only a few words in conclusion in a question of dates, to which a certain amount of importance has been attributed. From the fact that the moment when the delegates of the Aaland Communes expressed their wish for reunion with Sweden for the first time at the Finström meeting preceded by some months the day on which Finland declared her independence, it is inferred that the change of their political status assumed a direction and a character which from the very beginning was quite different, and has thus obtained a right of priority. This detail has no importance with regard to the question of sovereignty. The Resolution passed by the Finström Assembly merely proves the existence among the Aalanders of the wish to be detached from Finland and reunited with Sweden.

We have only to conclude as follows:

In consequence of the examination which we have just made, the right of sovereignty of the Finnish State over the Aaland Islands is, in our view, incontestable and their present legal status is that they form part of Finland.

To detach the Aaland Islands from Finland would therefore be an alteration of its status, in depriving this country of a part of that which belongs to it. We have only to examine if there are adequate reasons and sufficiently weighty considerations for the modification of this situation and for granting the Aalanders the plebiscite which they ask.

MOTIVES WHICH HAVE LED THE AALAND ISLANDERS TO WISH FOR REUNION WITH SWEDEN.

Before discussing the right of the Aalanders to have recourse to a plebiscite, we must review the motives which have aroused their intense desire for re-incorporation with Sweden.

Can we determine the moment when this wish came into being? According to the Aalanders, it was during the Crimean War on the appearance of the Anglo-French fleets which destroyed the fortress of Bomarsund and took its Russian garrison prisoners. A French writer, M. Léouzon-Leduc, who visited the Islands in 1854, has borne witness to the tender memories of their Swedish origin kept by the Aalanders and their desire to return to their former country: this he has noted in his account of his journey. But after that, no trace of these distant and persistent aspirations recurred.

They were re-awakened during the world-war, although the Archipelago remained deprived of communication with Sweden by reason of the blockade. We can well believe that the attempt at russification on the part of Nicholas II and his Ministers had provoked in Aaland the same feelings of indignation and bitterness as in Finland, and that the disappearance of the Tzarist domination was no less ardently wished for there. The lack of discipline among the Russian soldiers, after the revolution in Petrograd, the excesses and the acts of violence in which they indulged, made their presence more and more hateful to the inhabitants. But how can we explain the fact that, instead of making common cause with the population of Finland, who had proclaimed their independence, the Aalanders turned deliberately towards Sweden, with whom they had not been incorporated for about a hundred years?

A partial reason is, no doubt, the aversion inspired in this peaceable and conservative population by the revolutionary tendencies of the socialist party then in the majority in the Diet of Helsingfors. When they saw this party ally itself to Russian Bolshevism and attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of insurrection, they were only the more anxious to unite themselves to the neighbouring kingdom, where the peace of society did not appear to be threatened. Even after the repression of the Red Revolution, the anticipation of a fresh Russian offensive remained alive in the minds of the Aalanders, and at the same time the fear of one day seeing Finland, and with her the Archipelago, falling beneath Russian domination again. The best safeguard against this catastrophe must be, so they thought, the protection of the Swedish flag.

It would, however, be a grave mistake to assign purely political grounds for the wish of the Aalanders: that would be a misconception of its true character. For them reunion with their former mother-country is above all a question of nationality

In Sweden they see the natural guardian of their language, their customs, their immemorial traditions, of which they are proud and to which they are attached above everything else. Even more than Russian domination they fear Finnish domination, which would lead to their gradual denationalisation, the absorption of their population, which has remained free from all ethnical mixture, by a race of whose language they are ignorant and whose invasion they abhor. Statistics, which are very suggestive, have been shown us regarding the expansion of the Finnish race, which advances regularly towards the west, towards the coast and the neighbouring island groups where there is a shortage of labour. In Finland the Finns to-day form nine-tenths of the population, and as compared with their Swedish fellow-citizens they have the advantage of a higher birth-rate, with the result that the disproportion between the two races becomes yearly more accentuated in favour of the Finns. In 1885 the Finns comprised 85% and the Swedes 14% of the total population: in 1900 the proportion was 87% of the former to 12½% of the latter; in 1910 89% to 11%. When we add that Sweden is nearer Aaland than the mainland of Finland, it is quite easy to understand the part played by the instinct of self-preservation, as well as a genuine attachment sprung from memories of the past, their Swedish extraction and their constant relations. They have caused these peasants and sailors, confined at the extremity of Finnish territory in an isolation well calculated to develop a pronouncedly insular mentality and an essentially local patriotism, to look towards Sweden.

Should we look for other causes, material causes, for the direction taken by Aaland separatism at the end of the war?

The statements submitted by the Executive Committee of the Landsting speak without indicating any figures, of an important traffic with the port of Stockholm and are practically silent as to commerce with the ports of Finland. Finnish statistics only throw light on the sale of salt herrings brought by the Aaland fishermen to the markets of Abo and Helsingfors. In the event of reunion with Sweden the sale of this product would diminish appreciably if it was burdened with high duties, which, nevertheless, would not be to the advantage of the Finnish population. This point of view does not seem to have occurred to any of the Islanders, or else they imagine that Aaland would readily find in Sweden the equivalent of what it would lose in Finland. It has always struck us that economic motives do not seem to have exercised any influence on the wishes of the inhabitants.

The same is the case in the question of marks. It has been insinuated that the Aaland Islanders, who have been considerably enriched by the export of their farm produce and by their maritime traffic, have been driven to the thought of annexation in the hope of changing their Finnish marks for Swedish crowns at pre-war rates, and in this way making considerable profit, in view of the present depreciation of the mark.

This hope could not have been conceived at the moment of the first pro-Swedish manifestations, as the relation between the mark and the crown did not yet show an excessive difference. In their dealings with the Stockholm Government the Aaland Islanders have never raised the question of their marks being taken over at a favourable rate.

Thus nothing justifies us in thinking that interested motives intervened to excite the ardour of the demonstrators. This being so, it must be agreed that the moral and sentimental causes which produced their action fully deserved the sympathy of Swedish public opinion, which was prompt in espousing the cause of these brothers of their race who are desirous of entering once more into the fold of their former mother-country.

But was their movement spontaneous? This is denied on the Finnish side. It has been presumed, and even evidence has been submitted to show, that a campaign of agitation was conducted very secretly in favour of union with Sweden. Letters have been seized in which Aalanders who had taken refuge in Stockholm indicated in the month of August 1917, to their correspondents in Aaland means of propaganda with this object in view. A preponderant part of the organisation of the manifestations has also been attributed to M. Sundblom and M. Björkman. It is a fact that these gentlemen took the lead in the matter of the plebiscite, the idea of which came to the Aalanders from President Wilson's fourteen points. "A popular movement, however spontaneous it may be, requires leaders," remarked M. Sundblom to us. But it is equally a fact that the movement, once launched, turned without effort towards Sweden, and that the current has followed without resistance the tendency which bore it towards the neighbouring country.

In Finland the validity of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Finström is likewise the subject of discussion. Only the delegates of nine communes out of sixteen took part therein and they did not know, so it is stated, the object pursued by the promoters of the Assembly. The address of the 31st December, 1917, which was forwarded to the King of Sweden, contained no indication of a wish which was well established. The sovereignty of Finland over the Aaland Islands was not denied therein, and the hope was expressed that an understanding would be

reached between the Swedish and Finnish Governments for the realisation of the wish which was formulated. The Swedes and Aaland Islanders describe the first public expression of opinion as a plebiscite: it was not a plebiscite in the usual form of Yes or No, but a house-to-house collection of signatures, which were certified correct, as were the contents of the address, by a Stockholm lawyer! Further, there is a still more conclusive proof of the indecision which prevailed among the inhabitants, so we are told. In 1917 they took part in the elections for the Finnish Diet and also in those which took place in 1919, two years after the so-called spontaneous outburst of pro-Swedish sympathy. In the case of M. Sundblom particularly, his changes of attitude and language are in excess of what is generally permissible in a politician. He sat in the Helsingfors Diet as Deputy for Aaland in 1917 and 1918. Instead of pleading the cause of his compatriots there with courage, he distinguished himself by his patriotic declarations in favour of Finland! Such are the Finnish arguments.

Well founded or not, those criticisms are of little importance and those levelled against the principal leader of the Aaland Islanders have no effect upon the result of the separatist campaign. Even if it be admitted that the movement was a little indecisive in its beginning, it is none the less true that it spread with rapidity and that since then it has not ceased to grow and to strengthen itself. The Aaland Islanders have drawn unlimited encouragement from the patronage which has been accorded to them by the different Swedish Cabinets one after another, and by the European importance attained by their claims, which have been brought first before the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers and then before the Council of the League of Nations. As far as we ourselves are concerned, the words of the Executive Committee of the Aaland Landsting, and the silent and all the more impressive procession of delegates of all the Parishes, which we witnessed at Mariehamn, convinced us that a new plebiscite, were such authorised, would confirm by a sweeping majority, almost unanimously, the wish for reunion with Sweden.

Relying on this certainty, the Aaland Islanders claim the right to dispose of themselves on the same grounds as the Finns when they detached themselves from Russia. Sweden vigorously supports their request: "In the view of the Swedish Government the historical question is of secondary importance. The principal interest centres round the desire of the Aaland population. It ought to possess the same right of deciding its fate for itself as all other civilised populations." Such are the words of the memorandum presented to the Supreme Council by the delegates of the Swedish Government on the 4th August, 1919.

THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE DETERMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE CASE OF THE AALAND POPULATION.

It is just this principle of free determination (or self-determination) which is; as the Swedish memorandum states, at the bottom of the Aaland question.

This principle is not, properly speaking a rule of international law and the League of Nations has not entered it in its Covenant. This is also the opinion of the International Commission of Jurists. "The recognition of this principle in a certain number of international Treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations."¹ It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed by a vague and general formula which has given rise to the most varied interpretations and differences of opinion. It is no part of our duty or pretensions to treat these interesting theoretic discussions exhaustively. We shall confine ourselves to stating the considerations which arise out of its application to the Aaland problem.

First of all, we must eliminate an analogy which cannot be pleaded justly.

The Aalanders and the Swedes are wrong in citing the example of Finland, which, in determining her own fate, has succeeded, thanks to the results of the great war, in freeing herself from her dependence on Russia. As we think we have fully proved, Finland has been an autonomous State since long before the war, *i.e.* from 1809. But even if one persisted in thinking that she only became a State on proclaiming herself independent and after this proclamation, one would none the less be forced to admit that the Finnish people, with their clearly defined territory and a well-developed national life, fulfilled all the conditions necessary for constitution as an independent State. Whichever view is taken, no one will dispute the natural right of the Finns, born of inherent justice, to proclaim their independence; but this right which Finland possessed does not provide any evidence in support of the demand of the Aalanders. The Aaland Archipelago is only a small part of the Finnish territory, and the Aaland population a small fraction of the Finnish nation. Now,

¹ Report of the International Commission of Jurists (already communicated to the Members of the Council).

it is evident that one cannot treat a small minority, a small fraction of a people, in the same manner and on the same footing as a nation taken as a whole.

There is another consideration which excludes the analogy which it is wished to establish between the Finnish people and the Aaland population. Finland has been oppressed and persecuted, her tenderest feelings have been wounded by the disloyal and brutal conduct of Russia. The Aalanders have neither been persecuted nor oppressed by Finland. We have asked the Executive Committee of the Landsting what were its grievances against the Finnish administration before the war. It was able to formulate only insignificant reproaches. As for persecutions, it is impossible to define by this term the arrest of M. Sundblom and M. Björkman, in justification of which Finland cites specific clauses of her penal code. It is true that, as a result of quite exceptional conditions, the Aaland population is threatened in its language and its culture. But this is not the result of a policy of oppression; on the contrary, we feel certain that it is possible to appeal to the good will of the Finnish Government to preserve and protect the language and the culture which are so precious to the Aalanders.

The example of Finland is, therefore, in no way a conclusive argument for the case put forward by the Aaland Landsting.

Let us turn to the question of principle as it stands in relation to the Aaland problem bearing in mind that Finland has existed as a State for a century with the same frontiers, and that she has given striking proofs of her national strength and solidarity. Is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has the right of separating itself from her in order to be incorporated in another State or to declare its independence? The answer can only be in the negative. To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.

The idea of justice and of liberty, embodied in the formula of self-determination, must be applied in a reasonable manner to the relations between States and the minorities they include. It is just that the ethnical character and the ancient traditions of these minorities should be respected as much as possible, and that they should be specially authorised to practise freely their religion and to cultivate their language. This postulate marks one of the most noble advances of modern civilisation and, as it is clear that there can be no lasting peace apart from justice, constitutes one of the most powerful means of strengthening peace and combating hatred and dissensions both within the State and in international relations. But what reasons would there be for allowing a minority to separate itself from the State to which it is united, if this State gives it the guarantees which it is within its rights in demanding, for the preservation of its social, ethnical or religious character? Such indulgence, apart from every political consideration, would be supremely unjust to the State prepared to make these concessions.

The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.

In the case of the Aalanders, the important question is the protection of their language — the Swedish language. Its language is the very soul of a people. We appreciate the ardent desire, the resolute wish of the Aaland population, proud in its democratic simplicity and eager for independence, to preserve intact the Swedish language and culture — their heritage from their ancestors. The conviction that their language is threatened and can only be saved by union with Sweden has profoundly moved this gallant little race, which inhabits, from an international point of view, one of the most interesting regions of Europe. They have expressed their fears and their aspirations with such force that they have succeeded in carrying with them into the controversy, apart from the whole of Finland and of Sweden — the two conflicting parties — the public opinion of a great part of the civilised world. It is thus undoubtedly that the Aaland question has gained the importance and the character of an international dispute, the first problem of this nature with which the League of Nations has had to deal.

In spite of the lively sympathy with which the Aalanders inspired us, we yet cannot, in view of the heavy responsibility which is laid on us, accede to their request.

We recognise that the Aaland population, by reason of its insular position and its strong tradition, forms a group apart in Finland, not only distinct from the Finnish population, but also in certain respects distinct from the Swedish-speaking population. They deserve all the more protection and support in that they are, because

of their great remoteness from the Finnish mainland, left to themselves, so to speak, in their struggle for the preservation of their ethnical heritage. We admit also that the fear fostered by the Aalanders of being little by little submerged by the Finnish invasion has good grounds, and that effective measures should be taken with a view to eliminating this danger. If it were true that incorporation with Sweden was the only means of preserving its Swedish language for Aaland, we should not have hesitated to consider this solution. But such is not the case. There is no need for a separation. The Finnish State is ready to grant the inhabitants satisfactory guarantees and faithfully to observe the engagement which it will enter into with them: of this we have no doubt. To take the Aaland Islands away from Finland in these circumstances would be the more unjust inasmuch as from the point of view of history, geography and politics, all the arguments militate in favour of the *status quo*.

ARGUMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS.

We shall now review the arguments which support our conclusion.

Historically, the Islands belonged throughout the Middle Ages and modern times, like the Finnish provinces, to the Swedish Crown. With the exception of short periods and apart from certain peculiarities of their fiscal regime, they have been administered as though they formed part of these provinces. It may be questioned whether, in the eyes of the Swedish monarchs and their Ministers, the Gulf of Bothnia and the Aaland Sea did not form for the royal administration and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a kind of line of demarcation between the countries which were the ancient cradle of the monarchy and those which it had conquered successively, beginning with the Baltic Archipelagoes, on the opposite shore of the Gulf. The fact is that these different countries were grouped from the year 1634 in separate governments. The Treaty of Fredrikshamn sanctioned from a territorial and political point of view a separation which already existed for administrative and religious purposes. Since that time the Aaland Islands have followed the destiny of Finland, enjoying the same autonomy under the Czars who were faithful to their promise, oppressed like her by the Sovereign who broke his, and freed at length from the Russians by the events of the Great War and by the Revolution at Petrograd.

If one studies the geographical situation and the geological formation of these Islands, one is convinced that they connect with the neighbouring archipelagoes and through them with the Finnish mainland, but not with the Scandinavian peninsula. Against this statement it is alleged that Aaland is nearer the Swedish coast and that Mariehamn is the same distance from Stockholm as from Abo. One could say the same of Calais in relation to London and Paris. Such assertions appear to us to be of no value. It is another matter when they refer to the question of frontiers. A bad frontier, established by Treaty, is an inconvenience or an evil which a State is obliged to agree to. But if it is a question of tracing a new one, it is necessary that the choice should rest as far as possible on one that is natural and easy to protect. Between Sweden and Finland the natural dividing line is the Aaland Sea, a branch of the sea containing only a few islets. We have already given our opinion of the Skiftet as a geographical boundary. The choice of this waterway, where navigation is so difficult to superintend, as a customs frontier, would particularly favour smuggling, and Finland would suffer thereby more than her neighbour in view of the fact that her trade is less developed and that the goods smuggled into the country are articles of consumption, which she is obliged to obtain from abroad, or prohibited products. The surveillance of a frontier drawn through innumerable islands would be a heavy burden for the Finnish Government, which has less financial resources than the Swedish Government. There would be occasion for complaints every time that a Customs boat in pursuit of some smuggling craft ventured into the territorial waters of the adjacent country. In winter, when the Skiftet is only an icefield, smuggling would be no more difficult on dark nights, but would be effected by sledges instead of boats.

We have seen that the Aalanders form in Finland a group which in certain respects is not one with those which are Swedish-speaking. They are distinguished from them above all in their separatist spirit, which carries them towards Sweden, alienating them from their brothers in race who have remained Finnish at heart. But they do not form a different ethnical group: in reality, they constitute the fifth part of the Swedes of Finland, from whom they are not isolated geographically. The Islands, situated at the eastern boundary of the Archipelago, lie next to the islands of the Abo Archipelago, the three largest of which, Houtskär, Korpo and Nago, are almost exclusively Swedish so that the Skiftet is no more an ethnographical than a natural frontier.

Insufficient account has been taken, in the memoranda dealing with the Aaland question, of the opinion of the 350,000 Finnish Swedes, which, however, should not

be neglected. It is strongly pronounced against the separation of the Islands, except in the case of a section of the press in Ostrobothnia and Nyland. The Swedes form a minority in Finland which has long governed the country, formerly possessing the monopoly of intellectual culture and the privilege of the official language. To-day this minority is striving to maintain the character of its original nationality by the side of the preponderant Finnish majority, and to preserve cordial relations with it, while at the same time keeping up close ties with Scandinavia.

The question of languages is not an easy one to settle completely and satisfactorily in Finland, because there are in this country many mixed or bilingual districts, in which the majority is most frequently Finnish. The new Finnish Constitution seems, it is true, to establish clearly enough equality between the two languages. The essential point is, however, the application of this principle, and it is incontestable that there exists a certain tension — even a certain distrust — between the two linguistic groups. We greatly hope that the Finnish majority, whose predominance is assured for ever, will see its way, without abdicating its own rights, to be liberal and generous towards the minority. Only in this way will all distrust disappear — only in this way can there reign a peace and friendship proof against every attack between the Swedish-speaking and the Finnish-speaking Finns in the supreme interest of their country, to which they are all deeply devoted.

The leaders of the Swedish party have not concealed from us the fact that the agreement between the two unequal fractions of the nation would be irretrievably compromised if Aaland were ceded to Sweden. It would result in a diminution of the national territory, against which the Swedes would protest as vehemently as the Finns. But, further, the bitter resentment of the latter would be swift to change to hatred both against their fellow-citizens of Swedish stock and against the Swedes of the Kingdom. The Finns are vindictive and their vengeance would turn first of all on their unfortunate associates. Consequently, the loss of Aaland would cause an irreparable blow to the Swedish minority. Nor is this all: it would sow the seeds of irritation and rancour in the hearts of the Finnish majority, which might perhaps drive the Republic into political combinations and alliances directed against Sweden.

It seems that if European public opinion attaches importance to the fate of 25,000 Aaland Islanders, for still stronger reasons it cannot ignore that of 350,000 Swedes in Finland — their brothers who cannot possibly exist separated from the rest of Finland, where the groups in which they live often blend with the Finnish population.

Some of these Swedes maintain that before according the Aaland Islanders the opportunity of a plebiscite, it would be just to consult the whole Swedish population in Finland on a question so important for its future as that of the loss of Aaland. Others would wish to intermingle the question of autonomy for Aaland with that of a general autonomy, claimed by the delegates of the Swedish Communes in their own Assembly, the Folkting, which corresponds to the Landsting of the Islands. But the autonomy which they demand is a matter of domestic policy in which the League of Nations has no right to interfere. Nevertheless, it may be seen thereby what justifiable feelings the Aaland question has provoked amongst the Swedes of Finland, and what disastrous consequences a solution contrary to their wishes might have for them.

From a strategic point of view, the position of both countries is about the same. Sweden and Finland have both an obvious interest in being mistress of the Aaland Islands. But we do not see why the Swedish interest should take precedence over the Finnish interest and the latter be sacrificed to the former.

Aaland in the hands of the Finns does not constitute a danger for Sweden, and the reverse would be equally true. That the two Baltic States should be driven to make war upon one another is an idea that can hardly be taken seriously. The possession of the Islands is only of unquestionable military importance in the eyes of the Swedes and the Finns inasmuch as they fear to see them falling into the possession of a great Power. In anticipation of such a contingency, there are means of defence quite apart from the granting of the Archipelago to the one State or the other, and of which we shall speak when dealing with their neutralisation.

Political reasons in support of our conclusions are not lacking.

The services which Finland rendered to others as well as to herself, in repelling the attacks of Bolshevik Communism after a bloody struggle, should not be forgotten. Had she succumbed, the gate would have been opened to revolutionary expansion and Scandinavia would undoubtedly have been the first to be menaced.

It would be an extraordinary form of gratitude towards the Finnish Republic to wish to despoil her of territory to which she attaches the greatest value. Such a humiliation would be cruelly painful to every country, but more so still perhaps to a State which has the pride and the susceptibility of youth. She would thus be alienated from the Scandinavian countries, which have need of her as she has of them.

The Helsingfors Cabinet has signed a Treaty of peace with the Socialist Federal Republic of the Soviets at Dorpat, which will allow it to devote itself to the economic development of the country and to the settlement of its internal affairs. Finland

is none the less exposed to the subtle penetration of Bolshevist propaganda. We have no certain knowledge of what is going on in Russia. Even at Helsingfors when we were staying there, there were but uncertain rumours as to possibilities of duration or of transformation of the Soviet régime. In the field of conjectures which we are surveying, a long period of anarchy is not altogether unthinkable. But sooner or later Russia will rise from this chaos to become once again one of the important factors in the future of Europe. Shall we then see a restoration of pan-Slavist imperialism, as in the time of the Romanoffs? Whatever happens, it is in the general interest to hasten the consolidation of the States which have freed themselves from the Empire of the Czars to live an independent existence, and to help them to live and to prosper. Finland, in particular, is one of these bulwarks of peace in Northern Europe. We can only wish that she will grow strong under the happy influence of the League of Nations and that she will enter into the constellation of the Scandinavian States after the settlement of the Aaland question. It will have been an honourable task for us to have contributed to this restoration of peace and at the same time to win still more sympathy for a State which has made such noble endeavours to rank among the most energetic, the most hard-working and the most cultivated of nations.

It is true that in Stockholm another view is taken of the result which would ensue from a solution different from that which we propose. Aaland restored to Sweden would, so we were told, form a bridge between the two shores of the Baltic, on which Sweden and Finland would eventually meet in friendship. The Finns only see in the Aaland question the loss of certain islands: they do not see what they would gain thereby — the friendship of Sweden. But if Aaland were left to Finland, the relations of the inhabitants with the Finns, whether Swedish or Finnish in speech, would become as bad as those which existed between them and the Russians during the last years of the Czar's sovereignty. Finland could only keep the islands by force; disputes would arise which would make themselves felt in Sweden, for the Swedish people would not lose their interest in the lot of the Aalanders.

Sooner than share in these fears, we prefer to consider the great rôle which would then fall to Sweden — a rôle truly worthy of her civilising mission, of the generous manner in which she has unloosed her union with Norway and of the example which for more than a century she has set Europe in keeping outside every war. It would consist in calming the violently excited feelings of her protégés, and in seeking to extinguish the fire rather than to let it burn. Sweden consented to submit the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations. She must bow with good grace to its opinion, if it is not in accordance with her hopes and must use her good influence over the Aalanders in persuading them to accept the decision without too much complaint.

We cannot pretend that their disillusion will be anything but great. So sure are they of their right and so certain of success that they have been at pains to warn us of the consequences which would ensue from the rejection of their claims. "Never will the Aaland Islanders submit to a sovereignty which they detest," exclaims the Executive Committee of the Landsting in a document which was sent to us after our departure¹. They will sooner emigrate in large numbers to escape from this intolerable situation. Irredentism will never cease, from which will arise the most serious complications.

These forecasts are too pessimistic, these presages too gloomy. We have a better opinion of the Aalanders, of their judgment and their common sense. We think also that emigration, which has always existed in Aaland, will only be caused in the future as it has been in the past, by the enterprising nature of the Islanders and by their desire to enrich themselves abroad.

The opinion of the Aalanders who are loyal to Finland — there is quite an intellectual colony at Helsingfors and we met several at Mariehamn — is that the violence of the protests against a decision contrary to general expectation would gradually die down and that feeling would again grow calm on the express condition that the denationalisation which this brave people so greatly dread no longer threatens them. It is to dispel their apprehensions that we have turned our attention, in formulating a certain number of guarantees to be demanded of the Finnish Government, in favour of the inhabitants of Aaland.

INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

Before expressing an opinion as to the most suitable measures for the preservation of its national character for this population, we ought to mention two suggestions which have been made, but which must be rejected because, in reality, they

¹ Annex 5. Observations on the Autonomy Law, submitted by the Aaland Landsting.

would not solve the question: the first aims at a definite solution, the second only at a provisional arrangement.

It has been proposed, as the best means of solving the question between Sweden and Finland, to grant the Aaland Islands complete independence.

The Executive Committee of the Landsting would rally to this idea in despair of its cause, if its dearest wish, return to Sweden, proved unrealisable, and in preference to accepting the sovereignty of Finland'. But does the Aaland Archipelago possess the necessary capacity to survive as an independent State? We think not. Even if we suppose that prominent citizens of the Island possess the necessary experience and impartiality for government amid the difficulties of their geographical and political position, the Archipelago has not the certain resources which would enable it to bear all the expenses both of internal administration and communications with abroad.

These reasons would suffice for the rejection of such a solution — even supposing that Finland would consent to abandon her right of sovereignty over the Archipelago, which is outside all probability.

A transitory expedient has also been thought of, which would consist of leaving matters as they are for a number of years, five or less, at the end of which a plebiscite should take place. This arrangement, in the opinion of its sponsors, would have the advantage of ending the state of tension which exists at present and giving time for matters to calm down and for the inhabitants to reflect more dispassionately over the guarantees which union with Finland would offer for the preservation of their Swedish individuality.

But the Aaland Islanders are not in favour of it, and the idea was similarly rejected by the Helsingfors Government.

The Aaland Islanders are anxious to bring matters to a head: the idea of a plebiscite, which arose at a time of distress, has attained the persistence of an obsession with them. It engrosses their will, which aims only at this end. Patience for a period of years would be more than they can achieve. Further, the men who have given the impulse to the movement would not remain idle. The partisans of Sweden would not cease to keep up separatist agitation or to exploit the causes of discontent as they have done hitherto, whether in public meetings or through their newspaper "Aaland." Stormy manifestations and unexpected incidents might provoke repressive measures by the Finnish authorities. It could therefore hardly be hoped that peace would be established pending a final solution. The Aaland question would continue to trouble the peace of the Baltic countries.

In the acute phase which has been reached in this question, a final solution cannot be deferred, and it can only be based on the maintenance of the sovereignty of Finland.

Once this principle is recognised, some essential guarantees — to which we have already referred — ought to complete the Law of Autonomy voted by the Diet on the 7th May, 1920, in favour of the province of Aaland. They aim, above all, at the preservation of the Swedish language by teaching in the schools. To this fundamental condition we would add the maintenance of the territorial property in the hands of the natives, and in the region of politics, in measures against the premature exercise of the franchise granted to new inhabitants. Finally, we would suggest conditions for the nomination of a Governor who has the entire confidence of the population.

With regard to teaching, the Autonomy Law (Article 9) only stipulates that it should be given on the basis of public instruction in Finland. This assimilation does not content us. We propose that in the province of Aaland the primary schools and even the technical school, the Volksschule of Finström, should only give instruction in Swedish. If this is already the case in the primary schools, it is because the children who go there are all Swedish-speaking; but this teaching in Swedish ought to take the form of the obligatory exclusion of Finnish, confirmed by law. A similar guarantee has been inserted in several peace treaties as a measure necessary for the protection of minorities. The only objection made to this by some of the members of the Finnish Government is that such a stipulation might work to the disadvantage of the Swedish population in certain communes of the country. But we do not ask that the basis of public instruction in Finland should be modified: we would only request that such an exception should be stipulated in favour of Aaland by reason of a situation which is quite peculiar to itself.

To preserve for the communes and their inhabitants the exclusive ownership and enjoyment of their property the right of pre-emption should be accorded to them on every occasion that offers of purchase are made by a person or company foreign to the Islands. It may be asked why such a restriction on the liberty of business should

be necessary. The Islands do not contain mineral riches capable of tempting foreign capitalists, and their wealth in timber is not comparable to that of the neighbouring countries. This is true. But Aaland, by its situation in the middle of the Baltic and by the excellence of its harbours, is destined to become a ship-building centre. The development of this industry is to be foreseen, as it has already been successfully established by the Islanders. Finnish Companies will seek to acquire land for the construction of more important building yards there. This would involve the influx of Finnish workmen into the country, and with them all the consequences feared by the Aaland Islanders. The right of pre-emption granted to the communes and to the inhabitants would remove this danger. To prevent out-bidding, the purchase price could be equitably fixed according to current prices by a Commission to be appointed by the General Council, the provincial Assembly instituted by the law of autonomy.

The Aaland Islanders complain that every newcomer who has recently taken residence in one of their communes takes part in the elections. According to Article 2 of the law of autonomy, "all persons having their legal domicile in one of the communes of the province shall be considered as forming part of the population"; while Article 5 lays down that "members of the General Council shall be elected by universal and legal suffrage of all electors, male and female, over 21 years of age by direct, proportional and secret ballot. These arrangements are obviously in favour of the Finnish immigration, in giving strangers to the country the same rights as natives. We propose that the franchise should only be granted to newcomers after a stay of five years. This term of probation appears to us the most suitable. We have reason to suppose that it would not be opposed by the Finnish Government, which would likewise consent to the concession of the right of pre-emption for the communes and the inhabitants.

Article 4 attributes the nomination of the Governor of the province to the President of the Republic. The designation of its representative is incontestably one of the privileges belonging to the central power. But, on the other hand, the choice of a person sympathetic to the whole population and possessing a perfect knowledge of its mentality and its aspirations is of great importance for the maintenance of good relations between the Government and the province. On his tact and personal influence over the citizens whom he governs will depend in part the return of tranquillity and final pacification. We would suggest that the General Council of the Aaland Islands should be invested with the right of presenting a list of three candidates to the Government for the post of Governor, and that the latter should not be chosen outside this list.

In the matter of the provincial budget, Article 21 lays down that the General Council can vote conjointly with the general State tax an additional tax, fixed on the same basis and to be levied simultaneously. We were told at Mariehamn that the taxes levied by the State are already so heavy that little or nothing is left for the requirements of the province, and that the right conceded by Article 21 is a concession which is more apparent than real. It is impossible for us to say whether these criticisms are well founded or not, but we have confidence in the Finnish Government, that it is determined to win over the Aaland Islanders by its justice and moderation, and will treat them in a perfectly equitable manner.

In conclusion, we will venture to address some words of advice to the Aalanders. The prevention of Finnish immigration depends greatly on them and their strength of will. Legislative measures alone would be powerless. The first Finnish workmen were called to Aaland by Aaland Islanders, owners of saw-mills, because Finnish labour was cheaper, or because this manual labour was uncongenial to the natives. Finns will not go to the Archipelago if they find no work there and if they are not attracted by the enticement of certain gain. Instead of seeking their fortunes afar, the inhabitants must apply all their energy and all their efforts in making the most of their own soil and their own industries. In this way they will have much less to fear from the invasion of foreign workmen.

The guarantees which we have just enumerated will contribute to the work of making peace — of this we are convinced — a work in which the Finnish Government took the initiative on the day on which it voted a special law of autonomy for the province of Aaland in the Diet. This act of goodwill was not understood at that time by the inhabitants, and they disdainfully rejected the olive branch which was held out to them, striving after another ideal as they were. But if they leave the heights of their dreams for the *terra firma* of reality, the privileges which have been offered to them will no longer appear so worthless. To ensure their better appreciation of the advantages of the exceptional situation which would be granted to them in the Finnish community, it is necessary that the Government and Parliament of Finland on their side consent to make some steps on the road towards pacification, by adopting the international guarantees which we consider indispensable. They will certainly do this if they recognise, as do we, that by reason of this proximity to its ancient Swedish fatherland, by the closer bonds of union which it has kept with her, of the patriotism which it has shown intimes of war with a traditional enemy, and

which has not been extinguished by separation, Aaland deserves a place apart in the midst of the other Finnish provinces. These concessions will not appear too dear when Finland gains at this price both the peace which she needs to strengthen her interior organisation and the friendship of the Scandinavian nations which will be useful for her against the destructive forces of Russia. Doubtless pacification will not be achieved in a day: the hopes which have been sustained throughout three years of discussion and uncertainty will not easily subside into silence. But time is a great healer, and a solution based upon right will appeal both to the actors and spectators in this long conflict, provided that the victorious party makes a generous and gentle use of its victory and abstains from reprisals of every kind. The good will of Finland towards the Aaland Islanders will not fail to bring her closer to Sweden, and the more speedily friendship between these two nations is established the sooner will the tension in the relations between the central power and the province of Aaland be diminished.

However, in the event that Finland, contrary to our expectations and to what we have been given to understand, refused to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have just detailed, there would be another possible solution, and it is exactly the one which we wish to eliminate. The interest of the Aalanders, the interests of a durable peace in the Baltic, would then force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland, based on the wishes of the inhabitants which would be freely expressed by means of a plebiscite. But we refuse to think that the Government and Parliament of Helsingfors would not be animated by a broad spirit of conciliation, with a view to effacing all the traces of this long conflict, from which the international position of the young Republic has certainly suffered. It is of importance in this respect to recall that even the Aalanders who are opposed to the separatist movement declare with a unanimity and an insistence which is most striking that efficacious guarantees with regard to language and autonomy are absolutely indispensable to reassure the Aaland population and to establish a durable peace.

If the Council of the League of Nations were to share our views and recommend their adoption to the Finnish Government, certain amendments to the law of autonomy would be sufficient to give a legal force to the new guarantees granted to Aaland which would thus assume an international character.

Further, we believe that the rôle of the League of Nations ought not to stop there. It would not be enough for it to have given its powerful aid to the solution of the conflict. If difficulties, always to be apprehended, and disagreements in the application of the new guarantees which would be added to the fundamental law were to arise, it would then be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations to intervene to put an end to this. The Finnish Government, too, ought to grant the General Council of Aaland the right of direct recourse to this Council for its good offices. In asking admission to the League of Nations, Finland has shown her full appreciation of its intervention in the international disputes in which she has been involved, and the importance which she attaches to its great moral force. No doubt she will in the same way understand the use of its support for the settlement of internal differences to which the Aaland question may still give rise.

Instead of authorising the Aaland Islanders themselves to approach the Council of the League of Nations in the possible differences concerning the application of the guarantees, this right might be reserved to Sweden or to each of the three Scandinavian States. But we think Finland would prefer a procedure by which the Aalanders would not have to demand the intervention of a foreign Power. As to the part played by the Council of the League of Nations, we suppose that it would aim in the first instance at settling the difference submitted to it as an impartial mediator. But if this proved unsuccessful, Finland, as well as the Aaland Islanders, ought to have the opportunity of recourse to the International Court of Justice and request it to pronounce judgment.

PART II.

THE DISARMAMENT OF THE AALAND ISLANDS.

By the first Article of the Convention concluded in Paris on the 30th March, 1856, between France and Great Britain on the one hand and Russia on the other, the latter bound herself not to fortify the Aaland Islands or to maintain or create any naval or military establishment there. The annexation of the Convention to the general Treaty of Peace between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, also signed at Paris on the 30th March, 1856, gave it the same force and the same validity as the Treaty itself. (Article 33 of the Treaty).

This served to remove the uneasiness which was shown by Sweden with regard to fortifications which had been commenced but not finished on the Aaland Islands,

in the first half of the nineteenth century, and which might have served as a base for Russian aggression.

Half a century passed without the Government of the Czars making any attempt to modify the status of the Archipelago. In 1906 a cruiser was sent there, avowedly with the object of preventing the smuggling of arms into Finland. But on this occasion soundings were taken in the Bay of Bomarsund, a wireless station was established on Aaland and a Russian garrison was quartered there. This was enough to revive the anxiety of the Swedes.

The union of the Scandinavian Kingdoms had just been dissolved and Norway had been separated from Sweden. The Russian diplomats thought that they might profit by the political changes in the neighbouring peninsula to try to release Russia from the servitude which she regarded as a humiliation, and to obtain the abrogation of the clause relative to the Aaland Islands by negotiations with the signatories of the Treaty of Paris. They recalled having succeeded, during the Franco-German War of 1870, in destroying one of the foundations of this diplomatic edifice, with regard to the Black Sea. Their pourparlers with Germany ended in the secret Convention of October 16/29, 1907, which Trotsky published in the Swedish Socialist journal "Politiken," during the negotiations for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. There, a possible abrogation of the Convention of the 30th March, 1856, is mentioned, in accordance with the wishes of Russia, to which the German Imperial Government would not be opposed. After the revelation of this protocol, the German Minister at Stockholm explained to the Swedish press that his Government would only have made such an engagement on the supposition that a previous understanding existed between Sweden and Russia.

However, this secret agreement did not take effect. The Berlin Cabinet aimed at the exclusion of the Western Powers from the Baltic and to keep it outside their sphere of influence, by settling the questions bound up with this inland sea with the riparian States only, but doubtless foresaw that Great Britain and France would intervene to protect the vital interests of Sweden. For their part, the St. Petersburg Government allowed the abrogation of the clause concerning the Aaland Islands to fall into the background. Nevertheless, the Swedish Government claimed the right of demanding the maintenance of this guarantee. The following year, on the 24th April, 1908, the so-called Declaration of the Baltic was signed by Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Russia, but did not touch on this question. The High Contracting Parties merely bound themselves to maintain without change the territorial *status quo* of their possessions in the Baltic, both continental and insular.

The war completely modified the situation of the Aaland Islands from a military point of view. Fearing that the German fleet might occupy them, on the outbreak of hostilities, Russia constructed strong fortifications there and established a naval station, which was strongly garrisoned. In reply to the representations of Sweden she made reassuring statements as to the nature and duration of the means of defence erected against Germany.

Three years later, in December 1917, the new Soviet Republic decided to conclude peace with the opposing Empires. The Swedish Government thereupon demanded in Berlin that the Aaland question should be included in the negotiations which were to take place at Brest-Litovsk, to safeguard the vital interests of Sweden. At Brest-Litovsk, Germany continued her policy of settling Baltic questions to the exclusion of the Western Powers, who were now her enemies, and undertook to give a new orientation to the Aaland question. She considered the Convention of Paris as no longer valid, by reason of the war, but wished to maintain the agreement regarding fortifications. By Article 6 of the Treaty dictated to the Soviet plenipotentiaries, she insisted on their demolition. In addition, she decided that the situation of the islands from a military and naval point of view should be settled by a further agreement which was to be made between herself, Russia, Finland and Sweden, to which the neighbouring countries could adhere if they wished. Thus she re-established the ancient servitude, the terms of which were to be fulfilled under her control by the Baltic Powers. The clauses of Article 6 of the Russo-German Treaty were reproduced *in toto* in Article 30 of the Treaty between Germany and Finland, signed on the 7th March, 1918, and annulled later by the Powers in session at Versailles.

Finally, on the initiative of the Stockholm Government, the demolition of the fortifications on Aaland was the subject of a Convention between Germany, Sweden and Finland, which was discussed from the 27th June to the 21st September, 1918, and signed on the 31st December of the same year. Military contingents of these three States were to undertake the demolition. The Finnish Government in vain tried to oppose the despatch of Swedish troops to Aaland, but was obliged to yield under German pressure. However, the issue of the war prevented the Germans from co-operation in the execution of the Convention, and the work of demolition was effected by the Swedes and the Finns.

At the moment when the Aaland Islanders brought the question of their political future before the eyes of Europe, the *status quo* had been re-established on the Islands as regards the absence of all fortifications and all military or naval establish-

ments. We have therefore only to examine whether the restrictions imposed by the Convention of Paris are sufficient to prevent the utilisation of the Islands by a belligerent Power in the event of a future war. The example offered by Russia, who broke the Convention as soon as war was declared by Germany, would seem to prove the contrary. Stricter clauses might be suggested against the employment of new means of attack and defence, and more efficacious guarantees adapted to a fresh diplomatic agreement.

From a legal point of view, the Report of the Jurists' Commission has amply proved that the stipulations of the Convention of Paris are still in force, that they were established in the interest of all Europe and that they have created a special international status for the Aaland Islands. As these points of law have not been disputed by either party, there is no need for us to return to them.

THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS.

In the memorandum addressed to the Council of the League of Nations (2nd July, 1920) the Swedish Government has made its opinion known as to the international status which should be fixed for the Aaland Islands. It declared therein that if the Archipelago returned to Sweden in consequence of a plebiscite, it was ready to bind the country to the fulfilment of the obligations specified in the Convention of Paris in 1856, and even to consent to a more complete neutralisation of the Islands. In this case it is considered that an international guarantee should be demanded against the violation of the neutrality of Aaland.

Since then the Swedish Government has further examined the subject of neutralisation and an international guarantee. The form thereof which appeals most strongly to it is that of a Convention in which Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Poland should participate together with Sweden. In addition to the parties directly interested, Sweden and Finland, six Powers should also be signatories and guarantors, of which two, Germany and Denmark, are riparian States of the Baltic and a third, Poland, has access to this sea. A place would be reserved for Russia in this international agreement until such time as a Russian Government recognised by the High Contracting Parties should have given its adherence thereto. In the meanwhile the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, strengthened by this new arrangement, would remain in force as far as Russia is concerned.

The role assigned to the Council of the League of Nations would consist in inviting the said Powers to conclude this Convention and doubtless also to submit the text thereof for their approval.

These ideas are expressed in a draft proposal executed by the Swedish Government, of which it has been kind enough to furnish us with a copy, which we annex to the present report¹. In accordance with their authorisation we have communicated this document to the Finnish Government. The latter has submitted a counter-proposal which we similarly annex² and which we have also brought to the knowledge of the Swedish Government. The latter has made a number of observations on this text which are comprised in a Note which we have also annexed to this report³.

The Helsingfors Cabinet raises no objection to the neutralisation of the Archipelago, nor to the conventional form proposed at Stockholm nor to the number and designation of the signatory and guarantor States. Clauses 5, 7 and 8 of the Finnish proposal are identical with the Articles similarly numbered in the Swedish draft. However, there are a number of important differences in the other clauses. We will mention those which possess a political character.

The Stockholm Cabinet starts with the hypothesis that a plebiscite will take place, first of all, to determine the sovereignty of one State or the other over the Islands, as is shown by the text of Article 1:

"In virtue of an arrangement concluded on the..... between Sweden and Finland, a plebiscite will be held relative to the sovereignty under which the Archipelago shall be placed."

We are also of the opinion that the establishment of the political status of Aaland should precede the establishment of its international status. But these are, in our opinion, two different and separate questions. Further, we have rejected from our conclusions the idea of recourse to a plebiscite. The question of sovereignty does not need to be intermingled with that of disarmament and neutralisation. It will be solved immediately if our conclusions are agreed upon, by the maintenance of the existing *status quo*, in consideration of the addition of special guarantees granted to the population of Aaland. The suggested international Convention should, in our opinion, have as its sole object that of replacing and completing the Convention of Paris.

¹ Annexe 7. Preliminary Draft (Swedish) of the Convention concerning the Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands.

² Annexe 8. Preliminary Draft Convention by the Chief of the Finnish General Staff concerning the Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands.

³ Annexe 9. Memorandum containing some Swedish comments upon the Draft Convention for the Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands prepared by the Finnish General Staff.

We cannot recommend another procedure, which might drag out the Aaland question still further. We think that the international Convention ought to be devoted solely to disarmament and neutralisation and should end, as does the Finnish draft proposal, by designating the boundaries of the Aaland Islands.

The Finnish Government has not admitted that its right of sovereignty was contested, and it is for this reason that the engagements to which it would be willing to subscribe are made out in the name of Finland, and not, as in the Swedish proposal, in the name of "the power which possesses sovereignty."

After this initial difference, we come to a second, with regard to the territorial waters. The Swedish document does not indicate which these waters are (Article 2). The Finnish document established a distinction between the territorial waters of the Archipelago and those of certain islands which, while forming part of the Archipelago, are in reality outside it (such as the islands and islets in the Aaland Sea). This, at any rate, is our interpretation of Article 2, which is not clear. It will be remembered that the Treaty of Fredrikshamn fixed as the maritime frontier between Sweden and Russia a line running through the middle of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Aaland Sea, assigning to each of the two States the islands situated between its coasts and this ideal line. The Finnish proposal, without explaining why, assigns different extents of territorial waters to the two categories of islands composing the Aaland Archipelago — four sea miles and three sea miles. The Stockholm Cabinet, in the Note which it has sent to us, declares that these dispositions are incompatible with the frontier Treaty of 1810 as well as with the description of the frontiers in 1888, according to which the territorial waters of neither party could extend beyond the middle line which had previously been adopted.

Other differences, some of which are important, are relative to the more extensive rights which the Finnish Government desires to retain in time of peace for the maintenance of interior order and in time of war for the defence of the Republic, and also with regard to the intervention of the guarantor Powers with a view to ensuring the execution of the Convention (Article 6).

On the Articles in both proposals concerning dispositions of a military nature, we do not claim to pronounce any competent judgment. In matters military and naval, it is only experts who can make a pronouncement with a full knowledge of their case. Nevertheless, we would venture to state that in our opinion, contrary to the desires of the Finns (Article 4), ordinary police forces should be sufficient for the maintenance of public order, in view of the pacific character of the natives, and customs vessels for the suppression of smuggling. The less military display there is in Aaland the more assured will be the calm which prevails.

We see no better means of stamping this neutralisation with a really international character than recourse to a treaty in which, as is suggested in both proposals, the Great Powers and the States bordering on the Baltic should take part under the auspices of the League of Nations: the latter could even request other States to give their sanction and signature to this document.

It is also the League which, in our opinion, should be given the task of assuring the execution of the Treaty. It should be ready to appeal to the signatory and guarantor Powers if the clauses were not strictly observed by the State possessing sovereignty over the Islands, *i. e.*, by Finland. In the case of war, the neutral and guarantor Powers should intervene at the request of the League to enforce respect for the neutrality of Aaland by the belligerents.

As, at the close of the war, Germany decided to destroy the fortifications which had been erected by the Russian General Staff, we may suppose that she would have no objection to participating in an international agreement which is more extensive than that which she had in view.

As for Russia, what objections could she make to this agreement, as long as her legitimate interests in the Baltic, at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, were amply safeguarded by the impossibility of making the Aaland Islands serve as a base for any enterprise, military or naval, directed against her commerce or her territory? We should be glad to think that sooner or later she would adhere to the solution which we recommend.

Thus would be settled in international interests, as far as human foresight dare hope, this Aaland question which we have studied in all its different aspects. Having reached the end of this long report, in which we have sought to reconcile the warm sympathy which we feel for the Aalanders with the rights, the legitimacy of which, born of the march of events, we could not deny, we have but one hope to express: that our patient toil may be of service for the generous efforts made by the League of Nations to stifle local conflicts which delay that general peace without which bleeding humanity could not recover from its wounds and rise once more.

The Committee of Rapporteurs:

(Signed) BN. BEYENS.

FELIX CALONDER.

ABRAM J. ELKUS.

EMIL M. NIELSEN, *Secretary*.

O. L. MILMORE, *Secretary*.

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ANNEX I.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE SHIPPING TRADE CARRIED ON BY THE INHABITANTS OF AALAND AND CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS OF NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE AALAND ISLANDS AND THE MAINLAND OF FINLAND.

As a natural consequence of the Aaland Islands being surrounded by water, the inhabitants have from time immemorial been compelled to use the sea for their communication with the mainlands of Finland and Sweden, as well as for interior communication amongst the islands. The inhabitants of this vast archipelago have thus become very accustomed to the sea and to all trades connected therewith. The fishing trade of Aaland has therefore been very extensive and one of their main sources of subsistence. Of equal importance for the existence of the people has been the shipping trade. The Aalanders are born sailors, and their fleet of sailing ships, large and small, has always been quite considerable in comparison with that of the mainland of Finland. From the statistics made up over the shipping trade of Finland and Aaland for the year 1919 it will be seen that the whole number of ships of 500 net register tons and over fitted to trade outside of the Baltic and belonging to Finland was 83, with a tonnage of 91,500 tons. Of this number of ships, 16 sailing vessels and 1 steamer were owned by Aalanders, whereas the corresponding figures for Finland were 44 sailing vessels and 37 steamers, a circumstance which proves that the Aalanders have almost exclusively gone in for sailing vessels. To illustrate the importance of the trade of these Aaland ships, it might be of interest to state that they do very little home trade. Their trading between Finland and ports abroad is also inconsiderable, as same has brought gross earnings to the owners of not more than about 4,500,000 Finnish marks, whereas the total earnings of the Finnish fleet between home ports and ports abroad for the year 1919 amounted to about 106 million marks. This shows that the people of Aaland have taken but a very small share in the trading between Finnish and foreign ports, thus contributing in a very slight degree to the carrying of the imports and exports of the country. Against this, the Aalanders, with their large sailing vessels, have been trading practically only between foreign countries such as, for instance, England, Belgium, France and Western Scandinavia on the one hand, and South Africa, Australia, North and South America, East and West coasts, on the other hand; also to a considerable extent between the large continents of Africa, South America and Australia. In other words, they have principally taken part in the overseas world traffic. From such trade the Aaland ships have, during 1919, brought home gross earnings to an amount of very nearly 20 million Finnish marks, whereas the whole number of Finnish ships engaged in similar trade have earned only a total of 53 million Finnish marks. The considerable gross earnings thus brought home to Aaland from foreign countries by Aaland ships may to a certain extent explain the otherwise strange circumstance that the general standard of living of the Aaland people is actually considered much higher than that on the mainland of Finland, although, as has been shown by other statistics, the figures of import and export of Aaland would not otherwise justify such a situation.

In the event of the Aaland Islands becoming connected with Sweden, there is but little doubt that the Aaland people would not find their shipping as profitable as under present conditions. It is a fact that the expenses of steamers and sailing vessels under the Swedish flag are to a certain extent higher than the expenses on Finnish ships, on account of the wages of officers and crew being higher. The Aaland people have always managed their ships in a most economical way, even the crews being generally interested in the vessels as part owners. The expenses for victualling the ships and even the wages have therefore naturally been on a much lower scale than the corresponding expenses for shipping belonging to the mainland of Finland. Were Aaland to be joined to Sweden, the Aalanders would naturally become Swedes, and there is no doubt that the officers and crews of Aaland ships would be finally compelled to join the different Unions in Sweden. The owners of such vessels would then find it necessary to pay their officers and crews and maintain their victualling in accordance with the rules of these Unions. Furthermore, the standard of knowledge required in order that officers and crew may pass examinations so as to obtain certificates is much higher in Sweden than in Finland generally, and it would probably cause the Aalanders no inconsiderable difficulty to comply with these higher requirements.

At the same time that there would obviously be no benefit to the Aalanders through the trading of their ships under the Swedish flag, the shipping trade of Finland generally would naturally suffer a considerable loss through the number of ships taken off the Finnish register. As will be seen from the foregoing, the mainland of Finland does not own proportionately as many large sailing vessels as Aaland, and, seeing that the fleet of steamers generally is supplied with the best class of sailors from amongst those who have had their training on ships engaged in oversea traffic, it is evident that by the loss of the large Aaland sailing vessels there would ensue considerable difficulty for the remainder of the Finnish merchant fleet, especially as regards the steamers, to be sufficiently manned with trained sailors. Altogether, the Finnish mercantile marine is very small, and the transfer of more than 22,000 register tons to Sweden would naturally be an enormous loss to the country.

Communication between the Aaland Islands and Finland on the one side and Sweden on the other, has, as has been previously pointed out, had to resort to sea-passage in each direction. Although, as has been shown above, the Aaland people have quite a large shipping trade, they have taken very little interest or part in the maintenance of traffic between their main Island and the continents on either side. Nevertheless, they make heavy claims on the shipping enterprises on the Finnish mainland, as well as on the Finnish Government, and demand the maintenance of the most regular traffic possible between Aaland and Finland. Ever since the establishment of regular services between Finland and Stockholm by Companies situated on the mainland of Finland, the Aalanders have enjoyed fairly good communications, both in a westward and an eastward direction, through the steamers of the said lines calling at Aaland. In earlier times these steamers used to navigate only during the summer months, and then, during the winter months, the people of Aaland had to maintain their communication with the mainland of Finland only by means of horses and sleighs, across the ice, and communication with Sweden was practically impossible owing to the difficulty of passing the Aalands Haf. Since the establishment of traffic (with the support of the Finnish Government) also during the winter months, by means of passenger steamers specially strengthened for such traffic, the Aalanders have enjoyed communication with the mainland also during the winter. The cost to the Government has been very large, and quite out of proportion to the trade in goods or passengers supplied by Aaland. To give a light illustration of the burden falling on the Government for the upkeep of such winter traffic, it may be mentioned that calculations made *re* the expense of running a special small steamer between Mariehamn and Abo, calling en route at some intermediate islands, show this would, under the present conditions, cost the Government considerably over 1,500,000 Finnish marks per winter season. The Government have therefore not seen their way to arrange such special traffic, but have for the present winter temporarily hired a small steamer, to make only one sailing per week, the cost of which is, however, very heavy. It is expected that the traffic obtainable at ordinary fares will not cover even one-fourth of the expenditure.

Were the main islands of Aaland, with part of the archipelago east of same, to be joined to Sweden, all the waters east of the new line would also belong to Sweden, and it would obviously be the duty of the Swedish Government to keep open the passage through the ice during the winter months. This is at present done by means of the strong and costly ice-breakers of the Finnish Government. Judging by past experience of the way in which the Swedish Government has so far assisted the winter traffic through the actual Swedish archipelago on the western side of Aalands Haf, where actually no help whatever has been afforded by Swedish ice-breakers, and the Finnish steamers have been left to make their way at their own risk and expense, it is scarcely to be expected that the Swedish Government would keep open the channel through the ice as far as to the eastern parts of the Aaland Islands. As it would, of course, be unnatural for the Finnish Government, or for private Finnish steamers, to take upon themselves the heavy outlay entailed by keeping open the winter passage through Swedish waters, it is just possible that it would be found more profitable to move the winter services between Finland and Sweden to the waters north of the Aaland Islands, and run between, say, Nystadt or Raumo on the Finnish side and Stockholm or Gefle on the Swedish side. The said parts offering large stretches of open water, there would be found but little difficulty to navigate same during mild winters and on several occasions proposals have been made of opening a traffic on the said lines. Were this to be done, or were the Finnish Government to decide not to maintain winter traffic through the Aaland Archipelago, the whole south-western part of Finland, especially the port of Abo with its comparatively large traffic, would be shut out from the passage past Aaland and would have to utilise the routes by way of Hangö or Utö.

As may be seen from the foregoing, a large number of new situations with far-reaching consequences would arise were the Aaland Islands to be joined to Sweden.

Helsingfors, December 5th, 1920.

LARS KROGIUS.

AALAND.

		Net tonnage.	Value of ships in Finnish marks.	Gross earnings in Finnish marks.
1. In coasting traffic :				
Steamers	—	—	—	—
Sailing vessels	18	668.90	231.500 —	176.232 —
2. In coasting and foreign trade jointly :				
Steamers	2	714.06	1.800.000 —	1.745.590 —
Sailing vessels	26	5.393.17	1.822.000 —	2.839.126.40
3. In foreign trade exclusively :				
Steamers	—	—	—	—
Sailing vessels	9	13.923.66	11.925.000 —	19.881.415 —
TOTAL	55	20.699.79	15.778.500 —	24.642.363.40

THE WHOLE OF FINLAND.

		Net tonnage.	Value of ships in Finnish marks.	Gross earnings in Finnish marks.
1. In coasting traffic :				
Steamers	467	29.165.66	83.438.515 —	38.095.454.68
Sailing vessels	268	10.648.74	5.072.050 —	2.075.447.12
2. In coasting and foreign trade jointly :				
Steamers	135	26.728.81	87.907.742	82.865.605.51
Sailing vessels	125	29.491.12	24.632.800 —	21.506.874.63
3. In foreign trade exclusively :				
Steamers	—	—	—	—
Sailing vessels	21	29.456.35	29.375.000 —	53.012.865.84
TOTAL	1.016	125.490.68	230.426.107 —	197.556.247.78

	Steamers.		Motor vessels.		Sailing vessels.		TOTAL.	
	Nº	Net tons.	Nº	Net tons.	Nº	Net tons.	Nº	Net tons.
Aaland.								
1. Over 500 net reg. tons	1	536.58	—	—	16	21.543.63	17	22.080.11
2. 19 net reg. tons and upwards	5	1.455.60	2	500.45	178	34.600.88	185	36.556.93
The whole of Fin- land.								
1. Over 500 net reg. tons	37	32.973.57	2	1.129.12	44	57.390.43	83	91.493.12
2. 19 net reg. tons and upwards	809	92.551.36	110	12.311.25	1.117	140.161.94	2.036	245.025.56

[Translation furnished by the Finnish Government].

ANNEX 2.

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF AALAND ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO SWEDEN.

THE STATISTICAL MATERIALS.

The following account is based on the Statistical Department of Customs reports regarding import and export and are therefore authoritative. It should be noted, however, that the Foreign Trade of Finland, up to the beginning of 1918, did not register as the country of import or export the actual place of purchase or sale, but the country in which goods were last reloaded or first unloaded. On account of this, the statistics for the Aaland District (Customs Houses in Mariehamn, Degerby and Eckerö) show a trade with neighbouring countries — Sweden in particular — that is most probably greater than the actual circumstances warrant. Goods coming only in transit through Sweden, but not either bought or sold there, influence the figures for, as an example, Norwegian herrings. First, in 1918, were figures attached to the true country of import or export, the countries of the respective purchases or sales.

The trade relations of Finland abroad have been so far from normal during these last years that this account has been widened to admit earlier periods, *i. e.* 1900, 1910, 1913, 1918 and 1919, of which the years 1910 and 1913 should be given special attention as being the nearest normal.

THE TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE.

The population of Aaland is relatively dense and well-to-do, and has a higher standard of comfort than the average for the remainder of the population of Finland. Consumption should therefore be greater than the average for the whole country. The facts show, however, that the foreign trade of Aaland is, per head of population, only a small part of the total foreign trade of Finland. This will appear from the following table:

TABLE I

Year	In thousands of marks.		Per head, marks.		Trade of Aaland per per head in % of whole of Finland.
	Aaland.	Whole of Finland.	Aaland.	Whole of Finland.	
1900	1,817	468,400	79	173	45.7
1910	1,684	674,200	62	216	28.7
1913	2,005	900,200	74	279	26.5
1918	2,727	731,400	94	217	43.3
1919	6,351	3,378,500	219	994	22.0

IMPORTS.

The imports from abroad, stated in thousands of marks, are:

TABLE II

Year.	Aaland District.	Whole of Finland.
1900	715	270,700
1910	611	384,100
1913	509	495,400
1918	1,509	504,800
1919	3,495	2,505,400

If the percentage of the population of Aaland to the total population of Finland

be compared with the percentage of import to Aaland of the whole import of Finland the following table is secured:

TABLE III

Year.	Aaland District Import in % of Total Import of Finland.	Population of Aaland in % of Total Population of Finland.
1900	0.3	0.9
1910	0.1	0.9
1913	0.1	0.8
1918	0.3	0.9
1919	0.1	0.9

Still clearer does the trifling direct import of Aaland appear if the import figures are calculated per head of population in Finnish marks:

TABLE IV

Year.	Aaland District.	Whole of Finland.	%
1900	31	100	31.0
1910	19	123	15.4
1913	18	154	11.7
1918	52	150	34.7
1919	120	737	16.3

Assuming that the need for foreign merchandise in the Aaland Islands is on the average as great that in the other parts of Finland, an assumption which is fully justified in view of the standard of living of the population, we find that the population of the Aaland Islands has obtained foreign goods in the first instance by way of Finland.

As there is no reason to conclude that the inhabitants of such a geographically small territory as Aaland can manage with relatively less goods from abroad than the inhabitants of the rest of Finland, the above figures should show clearly in how large a scale the supplying of Aaland with foreign produce has taken place through Finland. Just in the years 1910 and 1913, which were pointed out as being nearest normal, the import of Aaland has been only a fraction of that of the rest of Finland. Only in the case of certain important classes of goods — Colonial produce, cotton and cotton-goods, minerals, metals machinery — in respect of which Aaland, equally with the rest of Finland, is obliged to satisfy its needs from abroad, has the import in Finnish marks *par bhead* been:

TABLE V

To Finland (with Aaland).

Year.	Colonial produce.	Cotton and cotton goods.	Minerals.	Metals.	Machinery.	Total.
1900	13	6	4	6	6	35
1910	15	6	6	9	7	43
1913	17	9	9	12	10	57
1918	33	3	9	13	10	68
1919	107	67	14	48	51	287

To Aaland.

1900	1	3	1	1	2	8
1910	—:38	2	2	1	3	8
1913	—:08	2	4	1	4	11
1918	30	—	4	9	4	47
1919	19	3	2	25	24	73

While thus the total import of Aaland in 1910 was 19 marks per head, and in 1913 18 marks, the import of only these few quoted goods to the whole of Finland was 43 and 57 marks per head respectively. For all the above years these figures, comprising only a few classes of import-goods, are higher than those given above for the whole direct import of Aaland.

In how great a degree Aaland satisfied its need of foreign grain by direct import in 1919 appears from the following comparison:

TABLE VI

	Through Food Office of Finland	Direct import from abroad
Rye-flour	710,000 kilos	75,102 kilos
Wheat-flour	122,605 "	76,615 "
Oatmeal	16,533 "	"

During former years the Aaland imports of cereals from abroad have only been negligible, although the consumption of wheat above what has been produced in the Islands themselves was considerably greater than during 1919, when it was still necessary to exercise the greatest economy with cereals. A comparison between the figures concerning the exports of cereals from Sweden to the Aaland Islands during former years and those concerning the exports from other countries show that if exportation from Sweden took place, it was quite negligible, some % more.

IMPORT FROM SWEDEN.

With regard more especially to the business relations of Aaland with Sweden, it is in the nature of things that these would be lively, though they can in no way be compared to the trade of Aaland with the rest of Finland. The official trade statistics give, regarding Aaland's trade with Sweden, the following figures, which, as stated earlier with regard to the years before 1918, are probably too high:

TABLE VII

Year	In % of Total Import of Aaland	Finnish Marks per inhabitant.
1900	39	12
1910	40	8
1913	60	12
1918	72	37
1919	90	108

These figures should show how insignificant the import of Aaland from Sweden has actually been. If one examines the detailed numbers given in the two accompanying booklets, the one covering the whole foreign trade of Aaland, the other business relations with Sweden, it will become still plainer that all more important purchases have been made in Finland and not in Sweden. As an example, only the import of goods belonging to the Colonial produce class need be pointed to. According to the general statistics over consumption in Finland the consumption in Aaland in 1910 should have been, calculating after the low average for the whole of Finland, 87,500 kilos coffee, 1,068 kilos tea, 300,906 kilos sugar and 29,471 kilos tobacco.

Actually, the imports from Sweden of these goods were only: coffee, 2 kilos. in 1910 and 0 kilos in 1919; tea, 108 kilos. in 1910 and 0 kilos in 1919; tobacco, 18 kilos. in 1910 and 1 kilo. in 1919; sugar 28 kilos. in 1910. In the years 1918 and 1919 the import of sugar from Sweden has been quite large. Thus, sugar was imported in 1919 to Aaland to the amount of 63,060 kilos., but in addition to this Aaland received 82,771 kilos. from the Food Office of Finland. Quite considerable imports of syrup and jams were brought about in 1919 by the scarcity of sugar in Finland. In connection with the foregoing it is of the greatest interest to note that the import of salt to Aaland from Sweden was only 12 kilos. in 1910 (from elsewhere abroad 40 kilos.) and 0 kilos in 1919, and yet salt should be one of the chief articles of consumption in Aaland with its large population of fishermen, etc.

EXPORTS.

With regard to export, the figures in thousands of marks are:

TABLE VIII

Year	Aaland District	Whole of Finland	%
1900	1,102	197,700	5.6
1910	1,173	290,100	4.0
1913	1,496	404,800	3.7
1918	1,218	226,800	5.3
1919	2,856	873,100	3.3

The total value of the exports, 2,856,000 marks, was divided among the following

classes of articles as follows: timber and wooden goods 1,172,000 marks, fish 1,099,000 marks, dairy produce 499,000 marks and fruit and berries 56,000 marks.

Per head of population the export has been in Finnish Marks:

TABLE IX

Year	Aaland District	Whole of Finland	%
1900	47	73	64.4
1910	44	93	47.3
1913	55	125	44.4
1918	42	67	61.6
1919	98	257	38.1

The greater part of this export has, as is naturally to be expected, gone to, or via Sweden.

Figures cannot be shown for the home trade between Aaland and the rest of Finland and it is therefore impossible to state exactly how great a part of the produce of Aaland is consumed in the remaining districts of Finland. Obviously this must be several times greater than the amounts sent from Aaland to Sweden. One need only consider the sales by Aalanders of pickled sprats, — Baltic herring — at the annual markets at Helsingfors and Abo. On the proceeds of these sales, a great part of the numerous fisherfolk in Aaland live all the year round. According to information from the Weighing-Office at Abo, 6,263 barrels of these fish were brought to Abo in 1919, or 751,560 kilos. corresponding to a value of about 1.5 million marks; this only in Abo, whereas in addition a very great part of the population of the whole of the South of Finland includes the Aaland salted sprat in their food. In the same year, 1919, only 59,154 kilos. were exported to Sweden.

That this fisher-population also takes its fishing equipment from the rest of Finland is proved by the fact that in 1900 only 36 kilos. of fishing-nets were imported from abroad to Aaland, in 1910 15 kilos, 1913 21 kilos, 1918 0 kilo, and 1919 0 kilo.

In Aaland there were 17 dairies in 1910 and 16 in 1913, which produced in 1910, 244,585 kilos. butter and 9,000 kilos. cheese, and in 1913 388,552 kilos. butter and 10,000 kilos. cheese. During the period under examination butter was exported direct from Aaland to Sweden only in the years 1900, 1910 and 1913. In the years 1910 and 1913, 160 kilos. and 191 kilos. dairy-butter respectively, in 1900 1,589 kilos, in 1910 1,502 kilos., and in 1913 783 kilos. butter of inferior quality. In the years 1918 and 1919 not a single kilo. was exported. No cheese has been exported from Aaland and the export of butter has been solely to Sweden. The butter and cheese produced in Aaland above that consumed in Aaland itself has been sold to the rest of Finland, or through the agency of firms on the mainland exported via Abo and Hangö to England.

Most striking in general are the diminishing quantity-figures in the columns for the foreign export of Aaland, or also their complete disappearance.

ANNEX 5.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE AUTONOMY LAW, SUBMITTED BY THE AALAND LANDSTING.

12th December, 1920.

As soon as the Finnish proposal for a law for self-government for Aaland became known, the opinion of Aaland with regard to this was expressed by the Executive Committee of the Aaland Landsting on its behalf, at the beginning of January, 1920. The form in which the law was afterwards ratified in the Finnish Riksdag, when the greater part of the Swedish-speaking members voted against it, has not modified the Aaland opinion, which holds good with regard to this law, even in the form in which it was finally accepted and ratified. The chief observations of the Aalanders can be summarised as follows:—

In accordance with the law in question, the whole population which figures in the census possesses the franchise for the Landsting. This decision in itself renders the law quite unacceptable for the Aaland Islanders. The drafting of the law leaves the field open for the penetrating and ruthless Finnish national spirit, so that within a short time not only would peace be disturbed on the Islands, but they would be also completely denationalised. The greater the extent of the autonomy granted, the more easy would be this process. Many methods of denationalisation are possible. The quickest and most effective, even if somewhat expensive, would be the purchase of a number of Aaland homesteads — (there are already a number of these in the possession of Finnish-speaking people) — together with the institution on suitable homesteads of industrial undertakings on a large scale. The Finnish workmen concentrated for these undertakings would form an excellent weapon for excluding the native Aaland population from the Landsting, as the latter, who live scattered about the Islands and in the extreme skerries, would never be able to avail themselves of their franchise to the same extent as the immigrant workmen, who would be living close together, with their wives and children. The direct result of this would of course be a Finnish majority in the Landsting, with the natural consequences that this would involve. In addition to the trying electoral campaign, when this stage was reached, the first inconvenience would be a feeling of discord and uneasiness amongst all the inhabitants of the Islands, which in its turn would be sure to lead to greatly increased emigration to Sweden and America. That the experiment (if it can be called an experiment, since for these reasons there is no doubt of the eventual result, which will be reached sooner or later) would be expensive and cost some tens of millions of marks, is of minor importance when the national Finnish spirit, with its brutal energy, and the importance which the Finns attach to the Islands remaining under Finnish sovereignty, is understood. The creation of the Finnish University of Abo shortly after the foundation of a Swedish one in the same city, a foundation which is entirely due to sacrifices made by private individuals, is a very significant parallel. Nor can we in Aaland easily forget the statement made by one of the most prominent members of the Finnish national party as representative of the Finnish Government, in the autumn of 1917 in Stockholm. In a weak moment he was incautious enough to say that if the storm blew over this time, good care would be taken on the Finnish side to see that the Aaland problem was never raised again in the same form.

From the Finnish side an attempt has been made to prove that the right of expropriation granted to the Landsting would be sufficient guarantee against any such attempt by the Finnish nationalists. This right of expropriation, however, only holds good in certain cases where compulsory purchase is necessary in the public interest. Obviously it would be difficult, if not impossible, in every case to prove that it is "in the public interest".

Aaland's right to initiate legislation is confined by the autonomy law merely to regulations concerned with ordinary private and economic law. This right is ren-

dered illusory by the President's absolute veto, which will naturally oppose any proposal for a law framed with the object of combating the efforts of the Finnish Nationalists.

The right of local taxation granted to Aaland has no real practical value, because the Finnish Government and Riksdag, for reasons which are well known, will take good care to see that the population's capacity for taxation is exploited to the utmost in other ways. The right of self-taxation would therefore either not be made use of at all or to an extent so limited as to render it valueless. But how are the expenses of the Administration of the Province to be met, as these include, in addition to the expenses for the Landsting and local authorities, the expenses for police, upkeep of roads, bridges and communications, medical assistance, inspections, education, etc... The taxes earmarked in the draft law for this purpose, the amusement and subsistence taxes, amount together to some tens of thousands of marks, while the sum of money required would amount to millions. The only way out of this difficulty would be for the whole of the ordinary income and capital taxes, together with a considerable proportion of the indirect taxes, to be granted to the Province, as in this way the fruits of Aaland energy and initiative would belong to the Province and be used for the benefit of Aaland, while the personal taxes would be paid to the Central Government. This, as a matter of principle, would seem to be a far better arrangement. The safeguard in the law against excessive taxation of the population is not satisfactory. The Committee dealing with this question is to consist of three representatives for the Government and two for Aaland. The Province's legitimate desires would accordingly run too great a risk of being ignored.

The faults of the law are a natural consequence of the fact that the law was not conceived for the benefit of the Aaland population, but simply to get rid of a temporary difficulty and to secure an important political effect. Competent authorities in Finland agree that the offer of self-government, made in vain to Aaland, could in no circumstances have become effective. Apart from the fact that its economic basis is purely imaginary, a fact which is obvious to everybody, it is certain that Aaland could not by its own efforts make use of an autonomy so artificial as that offered by this law. Not even the Swedes in Finland, however, are honest enough openly to admit this, although it is an obvious truth to anyone competent to judge either in theory or in practice.

On behalf of the Aaland Landsting :

(Signed) CARL BJÖRKMAN.

TEODOR BERTELL.

ANNEX 6.

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE AALAND LANDSTING.

The Commission has addressed the following question to the Aaland Landsting:
 "If the Council of the League of Nations should find it impossible to accede to the demands of the Aaland Islanders for reunion with Sweden, what would be the attitude of the population towards such a solution of the problem, that Aaland be placed neither under Finland nor under Sweden, but be granted an independent position?"

The Aaland Landsting ventures herewith respectfully to submit that ever since their country was violently torn from their motherland in 1809 and united with Finland under the Russian yoke, they have never been able to forget the land of their origin. Deep within the national consciousness has the feeling of community with Sweden and the longing to be received once more in the mother's arms existed, even if while under the Russian yoke it was impossible that this could be expressed in public. But as soon as the Empire collapsed, the old desire came to life by its natural impulse and, like a beam of light, President Wilson's noble message concerning the right of peoples to self-determination lit the fire of hope for the whole population of Aaland. Now they had a foundation of *right* to produce in support of their claims, which the population of Aaland expressed through its organ the Aaland Landsting, and which it has pursued ever since, with unbending determination and energy. The people of Aaland have in their contest only gained increased strength from the knowledge that they were fighting for truth and right, and that no selfish motive has played any part therein. The population of Aaland has felt that in its fight it has been upholding one of mankind's noblest and highest ideas. For this very reason, their position has been unassailable by those who, like people of Aaland, have wished to fight only with clean weapons.

It is therefore difficult to believe that a solution of this great problem is impossible in the way which, it is convinced, can alone lead to the triumph of right and justice. The population of Aaland has never imagined any other solution possible, and has accordingly furnished the Landsting with a mandate.

By its question to the Landsting, the Commission has placed this Body in a very difficult position, and the Landsting would have preferred to have had this question put at an earlier stage, so that the whole population in Aaland could, if necessary, have expressed its opinion on the matter under discussion. The Landsting is therefore very desirous that it should not be obliged to give a definite reply to the question before the attitude of the population to this new proposal can be fully ascertained.

But, on the other hand, the Landsting fully realises that, at the present moment, a great responsibility rests on its shoulders, and that at this hour of real need, as the Landsting cannot know whether it will have a further hearing before the Council of the League of Nations, it must give a direct answer to the question.

The Landsting, however, must point out to the Commission that the Aaland problem has been hereby removed to another plane. From the pure air of idealism, in which the question has hitherto been discussed by the people of Aaland, it has been transferred to an atmosphere in which the selfish motive of self-preservation must be taken into consideration. This motive has certainly appeared in the policy hitherto followed, but it has not had the least influence upon it.

It cannot be denied that the population of Aaland does not feel any bond of community with the Finnish people. The oppression of nationality hitherto shown by the party in power there, which quite certainly, as time goes on, will increase in ruthlessness and intensity, must be regarded by the population of Aaland as a most acute danger to its ancient Swedish nationality. The well-known fact that about half of the Finnish-Ugric nationality in Finland is permeated by communistic ideas can only fill the population of Aaland with the gravest fears for the future. In these circumstances, we believe that it will be clear to the Commission that Aaland's path can never, except in the case of the direst necessity, be the same as that of Finland.

On this account, and assuming that reunion with Sweden cannot on any conditions be granted to Aaland, it is evident that one road only remains for its population, namely, that mentioned by the Commission. The population of Aaland, in virtue of its responsibility for the rising generation's safety, must decide to accept this proposal as a last resort. It does not follow, however, by any means from this that the population would be satisfied with such a solution of its vital problem, and its impulse towards Sweden will quite certainly be just as strong as before.

On behalf of Aalands Landsting:

(Signed): CARL BJÖRKMAN.
TEODOR BERTELL.

Mariehamn, 12th December, 1920.

ANNEX 7.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT (SWEDISH) OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS.

In a Note addressed to His Majesty the King of Sweden, to the President of the German Republic, to His Majesty the King of Denmark, to the President of the Finnish Republic, to the President of the French Republic, to His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British territories overseas, Emperor of India, to His Majesty the King of Italy, and to the Chief of the Polish State, the Council of the League of Nations pointed out the desirability of concluding an agreement between the above States, with regard to a wider neutralisation of the Aaland Islands. The Governments of these States, in the belief that the prohibition to fortify the Aaland Islands, as laid down by the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856, and by the agreement attached thereto as third annex, is favourable to the maintenance of peace in the Baltic Sea, and therefore favourable to the maintenance of peace throughout the world, have resolved, with a view to confirming the above-mentioned prohibition and of establishing certain principles which are essentially connected therewith, to conclude an agreement to this effect and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed to the following articles.

ARTICLE 1.

The term "Aaland Islands" is by the present Convention understood to include the group of islands, islets, and reefs in which, in accordance with an agreement concluded on between Sweden and Finland, a plebiscite will be held to determine the sovereignty under which this group of islands shall be placed.

ARTICLE 2.

The waters inside the following lines are considered the territorial waters of the Aaland Islands.

[Inseratur]

ARTICLE 3.

The construction of fortifications on the Aaland Islands is prohibited. The establishment of naval harbours, submarine stations, military aerodromes, barracks, storehouses, and workshops for naval or military purposes is prohibited.

The territorial waters of the Aaland Islands shall be closed to all warships belonging to Powers other than that which possesses the sovereignty of the Islands. These other Powers are, moreover, forbidden to send troops or war material to the Islands, or into the territorial waters thereof, or to allow their military aircraft to pass over the territory or territorial waters of the Islands.

ARTICLE 4.

Notwithstanding the prohibition, laid down in Article 3, to establish naval harbours in the Aaland Islands, it shall be permissible, in order to ensure respect for the neutrality of the Islands, to lay mines temporarily in the territorial waters and to take all naval measures necessary for the berthing and passage of warships within the Archipelago.

ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of Articles 3 and 4 shall be considered as forming an integral part of European public law. The High Contracting Parties collectively guarantee their execution and agree to render mutual assistance for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6.

Should the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 be violated by a State, whether signatory or not signatory to the present Convention, whether in time of peace or in time of war, the military measures necessary for ensuring the above-mentioned guarantee may be taken regardless of these provisions.

ARTICLE 7.

Until such time as the recognition of a Russian Government by the High Contracting Parties allows Russia to adhere to the present Convention, the provisions

of Article 33 of the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856, and of the Convention appended as third annex shall remain in force concurrently with the provisions of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 8.

Within the period of one month from the signature of the present Convention, the High Contracting Parties shall collectively request the Council of the League of Nations to take such measures as it may deem necessary to obtain the recognition of the neutrality of the Aaland Islands by all the Members of the League of Nations.

[Translation.]

ANNEX 8.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION BY THE CHIEF OF THE FINNISH GENERAL STAFF CONCERNING THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS.

ARTICLE 1.

The term "Aaland Islands" is by the present Convention understood to include that portion of the Finnish Archipelago which is situated between the Aaland Sea in the West, the Gulf of Bothnia in the North, the Channel called "Skiftet" in the East, and the Baltic Sea in the South. The Eastern limits of the "Aaland Islands" are laid down in Annexes 1 and 2 to the present Convention.

ARTICLE 2.

The territorial waters of the Aaland Archipelago shall extend as far as four nautical miles from the coast of the Aaland mainland and, where there are groups of islands, from the outermost island or islet which rises above the level of the sea. The territorial waters surrounding the islands of the Aaland Archipelago which lie beyond the unbroken limits of the Aaland territorial waters, shall extend as far as three nautical miles. The limits of the territorial waters in the "Skiftet" Straits are laid down in detail in the Annexes attached hereto.

[Inseratur.]

ARTICLE 3.

Finland undertakes to erect no fortifications on the Aaland Islands, and to establish no naval harbours, submarine stations or military aerodromes, military or naval depots or workshops.

ARTICLE 4.

The introduction into the Archipelago or its territorial waters of warships, troops and war material shall be forbidden to all Powers; no military aircraft shall be permitted to pass over the territory or territorial waters of the Archipelago.

Notwithstanding this prohibition, Finland shall be authorised:

(1) To maintain in the Archipelago or its territorial waters, or to introduce there in, in time of peace, as large a number of troops and warships as may be required for the maintenance of internal order.

(2) To use the Archipelago and its territorial waters freely for the defence of the Republic if it should be attacked by another Power.

(3) To lay mines temporarily in the territorial waters of the Archipelago and to take all military measures to ensure that the neutrality of the Archipelago shall be respected under any circumstances in addition to the case, above described, in which this neutrality is threatened.

ARTICLE 5.

The stipulations of Articles 3 and 4 shall be considered as an integral part of European public law. The High Contracting Parties shall jointly guarantee the carrying out of these stipulations and undertake to render one another mutual support for this purpose.

ARTICLE 6.

Should the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 be violated by any State, whether a signatory to this Convention or not, and whether in times of peace or in times of war, the military measures necessary for ensuring the above-mentioned guarantee shall be taken by Finland. Should these measures prove inadequate, others may be taken by the Guarantor Powers notwithstanding the above stipulations.

ARTICLE 7.

Until such times as the recognition of a Russian Government by the High Contracting Parties allows Russia to adhere to this Convention, the provisions of Article 33 of the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856 and those of the Convention appended thereto as a third Annex shall remain in force concurrently with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 8.

Within a period of one month from the signing of this Convention, the High Contracting Parties shall jointly request the Council of the League of Nations to take such measures as it shall deem necessary to obtain the recognition of the neutrality of the Aaland Islands by all the Members of the League of Nations.

ANNEX 9.

MEMORANDUM CONTAINING SOME SWEDISH COMMENTS UPON THE DRAFT CONVENTION FOR THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE AALAND ISLANDS PREPARED BY THE FINNISH GENERAL STAFF.

1. In spite of the fact that Article 5 appears to imply that the neutralisation is binding upon any Power which is in possession of sovereign rights over the Archipelago, the use throughout the Treaty of the expression "the Power in possession of sovereign rights," without stating the name of the Power in question, following the example of the Swedish draft, would seem desirable in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

2. The provisions relating to territorial waters (Article 2) are not clear. It is difficult to understand why, under the first point, a limit of four nautical miles is fixed while, under the second, the limit is three miles. These provisions, moreover, are incompatible with the Frontier Treaty of 1870 and with the frontier delineation in 1888, according to which the territorial waters of the parties may not extend beyond the centre-line fixed therein.

3. Article 3 does not forbid the construction of barracks — as does the Swedish draft. This omission tends to undermine the provisions of the Treaty of 1856 with regard to "military establishments," which undoubtedly include a prohibition of this nature. Moreover, this interpretation was admitted by Finland when she became a party to the Demolition Treaty of 1918.

4. It appears from the above, as also from the word "maintenir" (to maintain) in Article 4, that Finland contemplates a permanent garrison in the Islands for the purpose of maintaining order. The Swedish draft, on the other hand, only provides for a temporary garrison which would not entail barracks and which, in so far as the eastern portion of the Archipelago is concerned, would only remain for a short time.

5. The Finnish draft gives Finland the right to make unrestricted use of the Archipelago for the purpose of the defence of Finland, whereas the Swedish draft only admits this right for the defence of the neutrality of the Archipelago. According to the Finnish draft, therefore, the Power exercising sovereign rights over the Islands could be expressly authorised to follow the example set by Russia during the war and to erect fortifications and adopt other military measures in the Islands.

Paris, February 7th, 1921.